All Heads Gently Nodding: How Naturalism Dissolves the Problem of Other Minds by Curry, Devin Sanchez
W&M ScholarWorks 
Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
5-2011 
All Heads Gently Nodding: How Naturalism Dissolves the Problem 
of Other Minds 
Devin Sanchez Curry 
College of William and Mary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses 
Recommended Citation 
Curry, Devin Sanchez, "All Heads Gently Nodding: How Naturalism Dissolves the Problem of Other Minds" 
(2011). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 353. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/353 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at 
W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
All Heads Gently Nodding
How Naturalism Dissolves the Problem of Other Minds
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement 
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from 
The College of William and Mary
by
Devin Sanchez Curry
Accepted for ___________________________________
(Honors, High Honors, Highest Honors)
________________________________________
Paul Davies, Director
________________________________________
Alan Goldman
________________________________________
Matthew Haug
________________________________________
Chris Ball
Williamsburg, VA
May 2, 2011
Table of Contents
Part I: The Problem of Other Minds                                                                1 
1 Reconsidering the Cartesian Viewpoint                                                                2
2 Two Problems of Other Minds: The Post-Wittgensteinian Approach                   6
Part II: A Naturalistic Methodology                                                              16 
3 Embracing Naturalism                                                                                        16
4 Science Paves the Conceptual Path                                                                     25
Part III: The Naturalistic Approach to the Conceptual Problem                   31
5 One Believes in One's Own Mind                                                                       31
6 One Believes in Other Minds                                                                              41
7 One Believes that Others are Minded in the Same Way as Oneself                   52
Part IV: Dissolving the Problem of Other Minds                                          76
8 Solving the Conceptual Problem                                                                         76
9 Dissolving the Epistemological Problem                                                            81
Part V: Concluding Remarks                                                                         83
10 A Qualification                                                                                                  83
11 Towards a New Naturalistic Paradigm                                                              91
Acknowledgments                                                                                                   94
References                                                                                                              95
Part I
The Problem of Other Minds
The epistemological problem of other minds – the hallowed philosophical 
quandary of justifying belief in the existence of other minds like one's own – is a problem 
about how humans come to know minds. Historically, most philosophers have broached 
the problem of other minds (henceforth the PoOM) entirely from their armchairs, without 
incorporating knowledge from relevant scientific theories. This thesis lays out what the 
science shows about how humans understand their own minds and other minds, and 
discusses what the evidence does to vindicate or deny leading philosophical accounts of 
attributions of mindedness. This evidence, drawn from work in psychology, cognitive 
science, neuroscience, and philosophy, strongly suggests that the PoOM is misguided and 
confused from the get-go and that there is no greater problem with belief in other minds 
than belief in one's own.
More specifically, my project in this essay will be to augment a fairly set-in-stone 
philosophical route to dissolving the PoOM with scientific evidence. When argued for 
from a conceptual analytic stance (without reference to findings in science) this route is 
weak; but when argued for from a progressive naturalistic stance it is much more 
plausible. The conceptual analytic approach, as exemplified by P.F. Strawson and his 
fellow post-Wittgensteinian philosophers, will be detailed in Chapter 2. My progressive 
naturalistic approach will be detailed in Chapter 3. I will argue that the sort of attack on 
the PoOM the post-Wittgensteinians endorse is difficult to defend without the help of 
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scientific evidence, but can be robustly defended with science on its side. But first, in 
Chapter 1, I motivate this project by briefly reconsidering certain key features of the 
Cartesian account of mindedness.
Chapter 1
Reconsidering the Cartesian Viewpoint
Rene Descartes held that he could be absolutely certain of his own existence 
before acquiring knowledge about anything else. The cogito, his infamous declaration 
that “I think therefore I am”,1 takes knowledge of the existence of one's own mental life 
to be indubitable. One comes to know oneself as minded not through a posteriori 
exploration, but through an automatic act of pure reason. Erstwhile, dualism, the lynchpin 
of the Cartesian account of mind, introduces a radical divide between mind and body. 
This split is not trivial; it is powerful and basic. It is not just that minds can be distinct 
from bodies. Rather, they are composed of a different kind of substance altogether. The 
split between mind and body is also, for Descartes, a given. It is not contingent on 
anything, but instead an objective logical divide. It is logically impossible for a mental 
thing and a physical thing to be one and the same, just based on what the concepts 
“mind” and “body” entail. That is, part of the definition of mind is 'not bodied' and part of 
the definition of body is 'not minded'. Dualism thus rigidly distances the (mental) subject 
from the (bodily) world. 
Notice the implications of Descartes' metaphysical dualism for his account of 
1 Descartes (1644) Part 1, Article 7
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epistemology. Knowledge, for Descartes, consists in the closing of the distance caused by 
substance dualism. Knowledge is the subject coming to understand the world. But, even 
if the subject becomes very knowledgeable about her world, even if that distance 
becomes very close, the dualist must maintain that the two remain isolated. It is always 
feasible, even when the subject comes to know and interact with the world, to distinguish 
subject and world without any overlap.
Accepting the logical nature of the mind/body split makes the PoOM inescapable, 
and perhaps unconquerable. The PoOM is the problem of attaining knowledge of other 
subjects. But, given this Cartesian framework, such knowledge is at best inferable, and 
maybe impossible. For the only thing a subject can know as a subject is herself. We come 
to think we know other people as minded by interacting with them in the world, not by 
pure reason. Given a radical logical divide, we thus cannot truly come to know other 
people as minded. Acquiring knowledge involves getting information from the world and 
this information must always be physical in nature. And thus, if we submit to the 
Cartesian framework, we cannot acquire knowledge of other minds.
The assumption of a general Cartesian framework, including some sort of logical 
divide between mind and body, is made not only by dualists, but by the vast majority of 
philosophers who have ever worked on the PoOM. From Locke and Malebranche in the 
late 17th  and early 18th centuries to Searle and Galen Strawson in the late 20th and early 
21st centuries, the history of the PoOM has, in large part, been the history of reconciling 
the Cartesian viewpoint with other minds.2 Descartes may have had good reason to push 
his viewpoint, given the relative dearth of extant scientific evidence regarding 
2 See Avramides (2001)
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mindedness available in the early 17th century. Most of his successors, however, and 
especially those philosophers working in his tradition today, have had no such excuse. It 
is my methodological commitment that, given the enormous progress in human 
understanding of the world as a direct result of the advent and application of the scientific 
method, it is a mistake to ignore that understanding. Rather, by incorporating our best 
scientific knowledge into our philosophical reflections, we stand to enrich and expand the 
breadth of our knowledge and the precision of our inquiry.
Moreover, I believe that there is good reason to assume that Descartes himself, 
were he alive, well, and brought up to speed in 2011, would renounce his own philosophy 
of mind. Descartes was, perhaps above all else, a good scientist. Despite being bogged 
down by theological commitments, strong naturalistic tendencies shine through much of 
Descartes' writings.  For example, in “Descartes' Philosophy of Science”, Desmond 
Clarke notes that “for Descartes, to explain a natural phenomenon is … to construct a 
mechanical model of how the phenomenon in question is caused.”3 In Chapters 6 and 7 I 
describe in detail a mechanical model that, I propose, causes the phenomenon of humans 
understanding themselves and others as minded. This model explicitly rejects Descartes' 
core views. Nonetheless, I cannot help but think it plausible that, were Descartes to 
examine the relevant evidence, he would be swayed by my argumentation and seriously 
consider giving up his convictions.
Thus this thesis will not assume that a radical Cartesian divide between mind and 
body exists. I will also not assume the existence of direct and transparent access to one's 
own mental states. There is much better reason to believe that the evidence will support 
3 Clarke 282
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introspective access to one's own mind than that it will support dualism, but even so, for 
reasons more fully explicated in Chapters 3 and 5, it is important that I withhold 
judgment until that evidence comes to light. For now, suffice to say that an integral part 
of reconsidering the Cartesian framework around the PoOM is rejecting the a priori 
assumption of mental transparency.
I hope that my unwillingness to assume dubious concepts prior to analysis comes 
off as somewhat trivial. After all, the job description of a philosopher importantly 
includes examining basic concepts. Furthermore, my challenge that philosophers are 
prone to assuming dubious concepts is hardly a new one. Francis Bacon's New Organon 
(1620) is a clear precursor to the progressive naturalistic methodology I endorse in 
Chapter 3 and employ throughout this thesis. In the New Organon, Bacon writes that “the 
idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and 
have taken deep root in there, not only so beset men's minds that truth can hardly find 
entrance, but even after entrance is obtained, they will again, in the very insaturation of 
the sciences, meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify 
themselves as far as may be against their assaults.”4 
I will spend a good portion of this thesis explaining how we might fortify 
ourselves against the assaults of dubious concepts like mental transparency because I take 
many philosophers, both contemporary and historical, to have conveniently neglected 
their jobs in order to remain under the thrall of Bacon's idols. However, perhaps unlike 
Bacon, I will be fully willing to reclaim previously dubious concepts if those concepts are 
vindicated by our best sciences.
4 Bacon XXXVIII
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Chapter 2
Two Problems of Other Minds: The Post-Wittgensteinian Approach
There are two problems of other minds discussed in the literature today. The better 
known version is the epistemological problem: the problem of justifying belief in the 
existence of other minds like one's own. This worry arises whenever a person believes 
that other minds exist, much like she believes her own mind exists, but runs into a 
difficulty justifying that belief that she does not run into when justifying belief in her own 
mind. In detail, the argument that sets up the classic epistemological PoOM runs as 
follows.
P1 One believes that oneself is minded.
P2 One believes that others are minded.
P3 The concept of mindedness at work in P1 and P2 is univocal.
P4 One justifies belief in one's own mind by virtue of direct access to that mind.
P5 One lacks such direct access to other minds.
C One must find another way to justify belief in other minds.
The above is a valid argument, and its conclusion is the epistemological PoOM. So, if the 
premises P1-P5 are all true, then the PoOM is a real epistemological worry. In particular, 
the conjunction of P4 and P5, in light of P3, casts doubt on the belief asserted by P2. The 
way in which one justifies mindedness is direct access thereto, but one only has direct 
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access in the 1st person case. Thus, unless one can come up with an alternate satisfactory 
justification, one's belief in other minds is dubious.
My rejection of the Cartesian viewpoint in Chapter 1 is far from new to the 
ongoing debate about the PoOM. Indeed, freed from the rigidity of Cartesian categories, 
contemporary analytic philosophers often argue that the epistemological PoOM simply 
does not occur. To make this point clear, they sometimes posit and work through a 
different version of the PoOM. This second problem is the conceptual PoOM, and it is the 
problem that some contemporary philosophers take to be the real issue behind the classic 
epistemological PoOM.5 The conceptual PoOM is the problem of detailing the concepts 
that are at work in the epistemological PoOM. Proponents of the conceptual problem note 
that the epistemological problem is confounding precisely because, as noted in Chapter 1, 
indoctrinated Cartesian concepts make it impossible to solve. So, because wrangling with 
the PoOM is futile, they attempt to sidestep wrangling and illustrate why the PoOM is 
itself futile.
The most widespread versions of the conceptual PoOM deal directly with P3 in 
the argument laid out above. They question whether the concept of mindedness really is 
univocal from one case to the next. One such version is the problem of generality. The 
problem of generality holds that in order to question the mind of another, one must have a 
concept of mind general enough to apply to others as well as oneself. Given the varying 
evidence at work in 1st person and 3rd person ascriptions of mindedness, and the 
plausibility that those ascriptions differ in methodology, it is dubious whether such a 
general concept exists. Another, related, version of the conceptual problem is the problem 
5 Avramides 219
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of unity. The problem of unity suggests that, for the PoOM to occur, the concept at play 
in ascribing mental states to others must be the very same as the concept at play in self-
ascription.
The problems of generality and unity both straightforwardly originate in 
Wittgenstein's (1953) discussion of private language in the Philosophical Investigations.6 
Wittgenstein's prime example is pain. The problem of generality questions whether my 
concept of pain is general enough to refer both to my own sensation of being whacked 
upside the head and to observing you react to being whacked upside the head. In my case, 
there is a distinct qualitative pain. In your case, from my viewpoint, there is only 
observation of behavior indicating such a feeling. Is my concept of pain general enough 
to cover my raw qualitative pain as well as whatever is indicated by your startled 
behavior? The problem of unity, meanwhile, questions whether when I actually state “I 
am in pain” and “you are in pain” I am referring to the same concept. When I claim “I am 
in pain” I know that I am referring to a real present ache. When I say “you are in pain”, 
however, I can only refer to your behavior which indicates a supposed ache. Given my 
degree of certainty, or lack thereof as the case may be, can the concept “pain” really be 
univocal as it works in these two statements?
As just noted, the epistemological PoOM, per P3, premises the generality and 
unity of the concept of mindedness in the 1st and 3rd person cases. It also, per P4 and P5, 
6 Two notes. First, while Wittgenstein's pain example originates and nicely illustrates the problems of 
generality and unity, Wittgenstein is not himself troubled by the problems. He explains why in the 
private language argument in the Philosophical Investigations. Second, the post-Wittgensteinian 
analysis of the conceptual PoOM (as explicated in this chapter) differs substantially from Wittgenstein's 
own analysis in the Philosophical Investigations. Those philosophers whom I term post-Wittgensteinian 
in this thesis are post-Wittgensteinian in that they follow in his footsteps and are inspired by his work, 
but they do not always argue for the same conclusions.
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premises a lack of unity in access to this concept of mindedness in the 1st and 3rd person 
cases. To combine these two facts is to say that the PoOM takes mindedness to be such 
that I and others can have it, but maintains that the way in which I come to understand 
myself to have it differs importantly from the way in which I come to understand others 
to have it.
While the conceptual PoOM can be phrased in many ways – as the problem of 
generality, the problem of unity, et cetera – it essentially boils down to a challenge to 
define the concepts that are assumed in the epistemological PoOM and then to determine 
if those embedded concepts make the epistemological problem internally consistent. That 
is, to determine whether or not the PoOM contains contradictory or false premises. 
Conclusions obviously vary, but one type of answer consistently arises from philosophers 
with a Wittgensteinian bent. This post-Wittgensteinian response is unique in that it 
addresses the conceptual PoOM not by denying P3, but by questioning P5. P.F. 
Strawson's account of the conceptual problem in “Persons” is perhaps the most 
prototypical of this type of answer.
In “Persons”, P.F. Strawson argues that by examining usage in language and 
rejecting Cartesian intuitions, the conceptual PoOM can be solved, as the concept of 
mind is found to be univocal in the 1st and 3rd person cases. However, Strawson takes the 
process of vindicating P3 to coincidentally undermine P5. He takes humans to have the 
same sort of direct access (but not Cartesian access) to other minds as to one's own. Thus, 
in solving the conceptual problem, he dissolves the epistemological problem. Before 
getting into the details of how Strawson's argument runs, though, it is useful to take a step 
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back and make clear his general methodology.
“Persons” is a chapter of Strawson's book Individuals. In Individuals, Strawson 
engages in his unique version of Oxford-style ordinary language philosophy: a practice 
he terms 'descriptive metaphysics'. Descriptive metaphysics (unlike most metaphysics, 
which Strawson terms 'revisionary'), is the endeavor of describing “the actual structure of 
our thought about the world.”7 While individual languages and terminologies can vary 
throughout time and place, Strawson maintains that there exists a “massive central core of 
… categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all.”
8 There is a fundamental human grammar through which fundamental human concepts 
are expressed, and descriptive metaphysics involves determining the precise role of these 
concepts in this grammar. It is Strawson's methodological commitment that “the reliance 
upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, 
way in philosophy.”9 He thus examines the actual human use of words such as 'mind', 
'body', 'person', 'action', and 'I' in order to attack the PoOM.
Strawson does not take a Cartesian logical divide between mind and body to exist. 
Indeed, for Strawson, the opposite is true. By virtue of human grammar, it is logically 
impossible to divide the concepts of 'mind' and 'body'. One's personhood, which is more 
basic (Strawson uses the term 'primitive') than either mind or body, consists of both. A 
person is a thing that has mental states and physical states, not distinctly, but in 
conjunction as states of that person. Particular states (mental or physical) only exist 
insofar as they are states of a particular person. The logical impossibility, then, is for a 
7 Strawson 9
8 ibid 10
9 ibid 9
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particular state to belong to anyone but the person to whom the state does in fact belong. 
We attribute 'has a mind' and 'has a body' to persons, but we never attribute 'is a person' to 
a mind or a mindless body. There are not, Strawson maintains, “two uses of 'I', in one of 
which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other.”10 It is therefore not that 
the person encompasses the physical 'I' and the mental 'I', but that the person is the only 
'I', comprising physicality and mentality. This unified 'person' is in fact the only way we 
conceptualize people through ordinary language. For Strawson, this fact is overwhelming 
clear simply on the basis of observable patterns of linguistic usage.
Strawson takes it to follow from this assertion that the primitiveness of 'is a 
person' holds in all cases. It holds when I attribute mindedness to myself just as when I 
attribute mindedness to others. If others are Cartesian subjects, logically divided from the 
world in the same way as oneself, then one can confidently ascribe a mind always to 
oneself but never to others. But, if others are complete unified persons like one is a 
person, if, as Strawson holds, mental states are only ascribed to a person insofar as 
physical states are ascribed to that same person (for this dual-ascription is what it is to be 
a person), then the concept 'person' is logically prior to the concept 'mindedness'. Further, 
Strawson takes the concept 'person' to only be useful insofar as there exist other persons. 
It is actually a necessary condition of the ability to take oneself to be minded that one can 
take others to be likewise minded. Otherwise, it would be a fruitless ascription. There is 
no point in ascribing a certain mindedness to myself in particular if I do not take other 
beings to whom I might ascribe it to exist.
But it is more than useless. The very structure of the concept of mindedness, as 
10 ibid 98
11
evidenced by its use in common language, makes it so that it must be used in both 1st and 
3rd person ascriptions. Strawson writes that “there is no sense in the idea of ascribing 
states  of consciousness to oneself, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to 
ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others. So he cannot argue in general 
'from his own case' to conclusions about how to do this; for unless he already knows how 
to do this, he has no conception of his own case, or any case, i.e. any subject of 
experiences.”11 12 The concept is fundamentally univocal. One cannot warrant ascribing 
mindedness to anything without understanding it as something that both oneself and 
others have.
How, then, do we know to whom we should ascribe minds? Strawson argues that 
we ascribe personhood by recognizing action.  There is a certain kind of bodily 
movement, called action, that is indicative of agency. Action is the intentional minded 
behavior of a subject. Persons act. And persons ascribe personhood to others by 
observing them acting similarly. Likewise, persons observe other persons acting, and 
ascribe personhood to themselves by acting similarly. 'Personhood' is thus a concept not 
arrived at in the 1st person case and then attributed to others, nor a concept arrived at in 
the 3rd person case and then attributed to oneself. Rather, we come to know ourselves and 
others as persons simultaneously through interaction. Humans necessarily see themselves 
and others as persons via interaction, and see themselves and others as minded via 
personhood. 
So, for Strawson, as the PoOM assumes, the concept of mind is general and 
11 Strawson 106
12 Strawson's italics.
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univocal. But, counter the PoOM, the way in which one comes to know one's own mind 
and other minds is also univocal. So, if one doubts the existence of other minds, one must 
equally doubt the existence of one's own mind. The PoOM becomes the problem of any 
minds. Moreover, as persons employing the grammar we use in everyday life, it is 
impossible to actually doubt the existence of minds.
Anita Avramides, in her 2001 book Other Minds, explains how Strawson's 
account meshes with Donald Davidson's account13, and implicitly takes her hybrid-
account to be the ultimate post-Wittgensteinian answer. For Avramides, action, or 
'behavior proper' as she terms it, is that which keeps there from being a divide between 
subject and world. Humans understand behavior proper, both their own and others', by 
virtue of occupying what she refers to as the 'lived position'.14 According to Avramides, 
the PoOM occurs to philosophers because, in accepting Cartesian categories, they 
distance themselves from real everyday life. Wrongheaded philosophers assume the 
stance of Descartes, in his armchair, alone in a room for days on end. From this 
philosophical starting point, it is easy to adopt the belief that the subject is merely a 
mindedness. After all, one has hardly any need to believe in other minds when there are 
currently no other minds that need addressing.
But Avramides wholeheartedly rejects this belief and starting point. She argues 
that in real life – the life of the non-philosopher – the subject is a whole person: body and 
mind. The lived position is a philosophical starting point that takes the foundation of 
inquiry not to be an isolated rationality, but rather a person interacting with other persons 
13 See Davidson (1997)
14 Avramides 229
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in everyday life. From this position, Avramides holds, it is plainly and naturally evident 
that persons are united by behavior proper.
If the post-Wittgensteinians (as exemplified by Strawson and Avramides) are 
correct, then the conceptual PoOM is solved, and P3 of the epistemological problem is 
vindicated. The concept of mindedness at work in P1 and P2 is in fact univocal. 
Nonetheless, the epistemological PoOM does not occur, as another of its premises, 
namely P5, is false. Other minds are not a special case; one, through interaction, has the 
same sort of direct access to the mindedness of others as to her own. I am not going to 
address objections to the post-Wittgensteinian conclusion now because, while I take 
myself to have adequately lain out the evidence and arguments that the post-
Wittgensteinians give for their conclusion, I do not believe that this evidence and 
argumentation is sufficient to support the conclusion. Indeed, in Chapter 4 I will provide 
an example of how well-accepted science casts aspersions on the account. 
I am, however, inspired by the post-Wittgensteinian approach. I believe that 
attempting to dissolve the epistemological problem by solving the conceptual problem 
can be a fruitful project. So, rather than defending the truth of the above conclusion, 
which is probably indefensible as it stands, I will attempt to bolster the project. I will end 
up asserting, counter the post-Wittgensteinians, that P5 is actually true, but that it is 
trivially true, as P4 is false.
The post-Wittgensteinians, at times, seem to crave reference to psychological 
literature. For instance, Strawson writes that “it is easier to understand how we can see 
each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act … in 
14
accordance with a common human nature”15 and Avramides notes that “understanding the 
kind of beings that we are and the way we act, with others, in the world can help to make 
the concept of mind that we operate with intelligible to us.”16 Nevertheless, neither 
Strawson nor Avramides use science, that endeavor which produces bountiful information 
about “common human nature” and “the kind of beings that we are”, to support their 
conclusions.
Strawson takes himself, in Individuals, to be engaging in descriptive metaphysics. 
While descriptive metaphysics may be a worthy pursuit, I believe that if an accurate 
description of the world is one's aim, then science should be the first place one looks. If, 
as Kant claims, the name 'metaphysics' is not accidental, then descriptive metaphysics 
should come only after descriptive physics. Methodological scientific inquiry into nature 
should not necessarily be more highly valued than philosophical inquiry, but, as I will 
argue in Part II, it should be taken into account at the onset of philosophizing.
15 Strawson 112
16 Avramides 290
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Part II
A Naturalistic Methodology
Part I introduced the conceptual and epistemological problems of other minds, and 
explained how the post-Wittgensteinians go about rejecting the Cartesian viewpoint. 
Namely, Strawson and Avramides appeal to social interaction and usage in language to 
solve the conceptual problem and dissolve the epistemological problem. While I do not 
take the post-Wittgensteinian dissolution to be adequate, I am inspired by the idea of 
dissolving the epistemological problem through solving the conceptual problem. Thus, 
Part II introduces my own methodology that I will eventually take to accomplish the 
same end. Chapter 3 explicates this methodology, which focuses on refusing to assume 
dubious concepts. Then, Chapter 4 examines the ways in which science can and cannot 
be fruitfully applied to skeptical philosophical debates.
Chapter 3
Embracing Naturalism
The problem of other minds is, at its core, a problem about minds. Minds, if they 
exist, and whether or not they are explicable in purely physical terms, are real natural 
things. One of the best (if not the only reliable) ways of studying natural things is the 
scientific method. Postmodernist worries aside, I am confident that at the very least all of 
the theorists with whom I engage in this thesis (including – perhaps especially – 
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Descartes17) would agree that science is a legitimate means by which progress in the 
understanding of minds might be achieved. Indeed, in psychology, cognitive science, and 
neuroscience we have sciences devoted entirely to the study of minds. Thus, as 
philosophical discussion about minds takes place, we should make clear what facts are 
already given to us by science. 
Philosophers who interpret science – at least those who have a command of the 
relevant compelling evidence and theorize not by appropriating that evidence, but by 
analyzing it – are not doing amateur science. Rather, philosophers who do not interpret 
science are doing naive philosophy. This much I take to be uncontroversial among a 
philosophical community for which naturalism is increasingly the norm.  However, such 
alleged naturalistic commitments are concurrently unpracticed. Most philosophers 
address the PoOM not only without reference to the relevant scientific evidence, but 
largely in ignorance thereof.
My methodological commitments are almost entirely indebted to Paul Sheldon 
Davies, and particularly to his book Subjects of the World: Darwin's Rhetoric and the  
Study of Agency in Nature. Subjects of the World is essentially a manifesto for what 
Davies terms 'conceptual progressivism', a naturalistic orientation towards philosophical 
inquiry that expects old concepts to be unsettled by cutting-edge science. For the 
conceptual progressivist, inquiry is exploration. Her goal is not to preserve concepts 
wantonly but to make sure all of her concepts, whether historically or psychologically 
entrenched or new, conform to the world (as studied scientifically).
For Davies, Darwin is the model progressive naturalist. Darwin's theory of 
17 See Descartes (1949 and 1964); especially his discussion of the pineal gland as the “seat of the soul.”
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evolution by natural selection did not, like its contemporaries, attempt to uphold 
creationism when the science overwhelmingly showed that it was a dubious concept. 
Indeed, he not only refused to let any entrenched concepts compel him to interpret his 
scientific evidence in any certain way, but moreover expected his formerly entrenched 
concepts to be upset by the evidence. Darwin also, as any progressive naturalist must, 
understood that the new conceptual categories he was proposing might be jarring; for 
example, he realized that people had difficulty conceptualizing large changes being the 
product of millions of slight variations over millions of years.18 He interpreted the 
scientific evidence in light of only itself, and from the world devised those concepts 
worth believing.
The progressivist's foil is the 'conceptual conservative'. Conceptual conservatives 
are, as the name suggests, simply thinkers who attempt to conserve hallowed concepts, 
whether those concepts are passed on by tradition, religion, history, science, or intuition. 
According to Davies, there are two types of conceptual conservatism. The first focuses on 
the preservation of “any concept that appears important within some well-developed 
scientific theory”19, and the second focuses on the preservation of “any concept that 
appears important within our general worldview.”20 Both types focus, then, on the 
preservation of certain concepts as we pursue knowledge. They do so because of a couple 
of misguided heuristics that have long held sway in theology and philosophy. The first of 
these heuristics is that the longer the historical roots of a concept, the more likely it is a 
good concept. The second is that the more venerated a concept, the more important it is to 
18 Darwin 34
19 Davies 24
20 ibid
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integrate with new knowledge. In other words, the conceptual conservative premises 
concepts based on neither a priori nor a posteriori argumentation, but instead merely 
because they are concepts which tend (and have tended) to be premised in religious or 
philosophical debates.
Particularly egregious conservatives are what Davies terms 'conceptual 
imperialists'. Conceptual imperialists not only try to save outdated concepts in light of 
contrary scientific evidence, but allow those concepts to dominate that evidence. They 
reject any evidence that is counter to their venerated concepts. For example, the 
philosopher Roderick Chisholm is an imperialist with regards to free will.21 He attempts 
not only to preserve the concept of humans as unmoved movers in light of science, but 
indeed is willing to distort or disregard science entirely in order to uphold his concept.22 
This attempt to preserve venerable concepts is not, in and of itself, a bad thing. However, 
the attempt to preserve dubious concepts, no matter how venerable, is.
Theology and much of philosophy are conservative or imperialistic in that, unlike 
Darwin, they engage in the concept location project for dubious concepts. The concept 
location project involves taking preset concepts and figuring out how they fit with 
science. The problem is that these concepts that are assumed to exist are often dubious in 
one or both of two ways. They may be dubious by descent in that – like Francis Bacon's 
idols of the marketplace and theater23 – they arose from a now defunct worldview. Or 
they may be dubious by psychological role in that – like Bacon's idols of the tribe and 
cave24 – they arise from a human psychological module that is apt to generate false-
21 Chisholm 25
22 Davies 26
23 Bacon XLIII and XLIV
24 Bacon XLI and XLII
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positives. Conservative and imperialistic theologians and philosophers attempt to 
preserve these dubious concepts whether or not they are supported by the evidence.
A concept is dubious by descent if it arose from a worldview no longer regarded 
to be true, especially if that worldview is theological or political in any way. This is not to 
claim that theological or political views are necessarily false, but only that their blind 
preservation has no place in scientific or philosophical inquiry. For, as Bacon notes, 
concepts dubious by descent “plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all 
into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle 
fancies.”25
So, for example, Chisholm's concept of libertarian free will is dubious by descent. 
The concept has strong roots in Western theological and philosophical history, tracing 
back to Descartes (who claimed that men have an "infinite" will) and firmly to Judeo-
Christian theology. There is nothing in the science which plausibly supports libertarian 
free will, and very few avowed naturalists buy into Cartesian or Judeo-Christian doctrine 
today. So, we should not, as Chisholm does, make it a condition of adequacy on our 
theorizing that we preserve this concept of free will. We should bracket the concept – not 
throw it out, but set it aside – and, as inquiry progresses, note how the evidence 
independently supports or rejects it. This is progressive in that it expects and allows the 
concept of free will to be unsettled by the evidence, does not allow the concept to be 
preserved if it does not conform to our understanding of the world, and yet still leaves 
room for the concept to be vindicated if that is what the evidence demands.
A concept is dubious by psychological role insofar as intuition is our strongest 
25 Bacon XLIII 
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available reason to uphold it. An important lesson from contemporary cognitive 
psychology is that some of the human mind's most basic conceptualizing capacities lead 
us to believe things that are false. For various evolutionary reasons, we have 
psychological modules underwriting consciousness that are motivated by factors other 
than the truth, and thus generate an abundance of false positives. In defending this point 
Davies obviously makes reference to a considerably deeper reservoir of scientific 
evidence than was available to Bacon in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. But Bacon 
notices the dubiousness of concepts propagated by psychological role all the same, 
writing that “it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the 
contrary, all perceptions both of the sense and of the mind are according to the measure 
of the individual, and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human 
understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and 
discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.”26
Take, for example, what novelist David Foster Wallace terms the 'default setting': 
my overriding intuition that I am the exact conceptual center of the universe.27 All of my 
experiences are of things and events in relation to me, and only in relation to me. I thus 
naturally, by virtue of my psychological relationship to the world, have a concept of 
myself as the most important thing in the universe. This is, of course, false. And so too 
might be other (less obviously wrongheaded) concepts that play important roles in our 
psychology. Thus, we should not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical 
theorizing that we preserve such concepts, but instead should seek to understand the role 
26 Bacon XLI
27 Wallace 38
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of the concept and thereby figure out if it is worthwhile. This is progressive in that it 
expects our capacities to be deceptive, and seeks to figure out just what brings concepts 
about before making a judgment on whether or not those concepts are veridical.
Davies proposes directives for naturalistic inquiry which help philosophers avoid 
conservatism and pursue progressivism. Two of those directives, precisely those 
directives that order us to avoid dubious concepts not justified by science, run as follows. 
Concepts dubious by descent (DD): For any concept dubious by virtue of descent, 
do not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical theorizing that we 
preserve or otherwise "save" that concept; rather, bracket the concept with the 
expectation that it will be explained away or vindicated as inquiry progresses – as 
we analyze inwardly and synthesize laterally.28
Concepts dubious by psychological role (DP): For any concept dubious by 
psychological role, do not make it a condition of adequacy on our philosophical 
theorizing that we preserve or otherwise "save" that concept; rather, require that 
we identify the conditions (if any) under which the concept is correctly applied 
and withhold antecedent authority from that concept under all other conditions.29
It is important to stress that if the science does bear out dubious concepts, then the 
progressive will gladly reclaim them. So if good scientific evidence emerges that Devin 
28 Davies 42
29 Davies 44
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Sanchez Curry is the most important thing in the universe, then the progressive should 
happily accept that fact. But until that empirical evidence emerges – until that concept is 
no longer extremely dubious – it should not be taken as true.
In Bacon and Descartes' day, thinkers had access to significantly less empirical 
evidence about the world than they do today. Even so, as glossed in Chapter 1, Descartes 
labored to understand the natural world on its own terms. The same, unfortunately, cannot 
be said for much of the grand tradition of thought which followed in his footsteps. The 
Cartesian viewpoint on mindedness, as it is held today, is dubious by both descent and 
psychological role.
That dualism is dubious by descent is strikingly clear. It is a concept that arose 
from various deeply theological worldviews that assume that humans possess immaterial 
(and immortal) souls. Whether contemporary dualists are following Plato, Averroes, 
Aquinas, Descartes, or their local preacher, they are attempting to preserve a concept 
which the science simply does not bear out. It is conceivable that a radical mind/body 
split exists, but it is highly dubious, both because there is nothing concrete speaking for it 
in the science, and because it is a concept that is often propagated in fulfillment of  purely 
dogmatic motives. In Chapter 5 I will explain how another integral part of the Cartesian 
account of mindedness – the mental transparency assumption – is dubious by both 
descent and psychological role.
Dualism, insofar as it has any serious influence today, is a theory latched onto by 
conceptual conservatives and imperialists attempting to preserve and propagate deeply 
dubious faiths and intuitions. By explicitly bracketing the concept of substance dualism, 
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the post-Wittgensteinians are taking an important step away from conservatism and 
towards progressivism. The goal of this thesis, then, could be construed as guiding 
philosophers working on the PoOM today the rest of the way into a progressive naturalist 
mindset.
Post-Wittgensteinian thought, while distancing itself from the Cartestian 
viewpoint, still attempts the philosophical PoOM without recourse to the scientific facts 
at its disposal. Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers thus run the risk of themselves pushing 
concepts that are dubious by descent and/or psychological role. Further, unlike Descartes, 
they do so in an era in which they have ample access to a vast and ever-expanding wealth 
of scientific literature. To ignore this literature is a grave mistake, and it is difficult to 
warrant taking seriously any philosopher – indeed any theorist in any field – who does so. 
Thus, so that we might be able to seriously consider their position, the remainder of this 
thesis intends to correct that mistake on the part of the post-Wittgensteinians. In Chapter 
4 I will examine an application in which the science appears to cast aspersions on the 
post-Wittgensteinian account, but end up marking it as a prime example of the wrong 
way of going about applying science to philosophical debates. In Part III I will go about 
applying science to philosophy the right way: by framing the conceptual PoOM as a 
target of naturalist inquiry, and replacing the dubious concepts that cloud the topic with 
naturalistically acceptable concepts. Then, in Part IV, I will examine how well the post-
Wittgensteinian conclusions map onto the naturalistic conclusions.
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Chapter 4
Science Paves the Conceptual Path
The problem of other minds is not a problem if there is no belief in other minds to 
justify. But before I go on, I should distinguish between two types of belief. The first is 
what I term 'explicit belief'. We explicitly believe things when we have good reason to 
think they are true, based on consciously considered evidence. However, we also have 
'implicit beliefs'. A belief is implicit when we believe it whether or not we have 
considered evidence that justifies believing it. Some implicit beliefs may be unavoidable, 
while others may be open to some kind of control. 
Now, there is fairly good reason to assume I believe in other minds in one way or 
the other. After all, I interact with others everyday and each of those interactions turns on 
the coacknowledged (i.e. at least apparently implicitly believed) fact that each of us has a 
mind. That is to say that each of us has, and acknowledges that the other has, those 
mental states such as intentions, beliefs, desires, et cetera, that philosophers call 
propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are those mental states that indicate a 
person's relationship to a proposition. I certainly at least acknowledge that others have 
attitudes about things in the world. But such anecdotal evidence immediately raises a red 
flag. Does the acknowledgment of mental states in the above interaction entail belief in 
mental states, or might that acknowledgment be made in lieu of actual belief because 
acknowledgment of mental states is useful for the interaction? It seems straightforward 
that if one does not really believe in other minds, and instead only treats others as minded 
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because it is a useful thing to do, then the PoOM does not occur. P2 of the argument laid 
out in Chapter 2 is false: there is no real belief in other minds to justify.
Prima facie this may seem like a queer concern. It is a question about what I 
believe, and it is frequently assumed, among philosophers and laypersons, that I am not 
only the eminent authority on what I believe, but am flawless in attributions of belief to 
myself. The assumption is that it is a truism that I believe what I think I believe. In 
Chapter 5 I will address why this assumption is dubious. For now it will suffice to 
explore the question of whether I believe in other minds because I believe them to truly 
exist (as opposed to treating other minds as existent on instrumental grounds) from a third 
person perspective, without appeal to my own intuitions.
I will argue that in light of psychological research on mindreading30, the 
possibility that belief in other minds is driven by utility is not a good challenge to the 
PoOM. But the challenge will not be dismissed because the utility claim is dismissed. 
Rather, it is plausible that one implicitly believes in other minds for mainly instrumental 
purposes, but that this possibility only strengthens the PoOM. 
Most psychologists today hold that humans cannot help but see other animated 
objects as minded. Specifically, they claim that the human mind comprises, in part, a 
mindreading component: a set of capacities that incline humans to see themselves and 
others as minded. In essence, mindreading constitutes the biological impetus for the 
human ability to attribute, and thus believe in, minds. How and on what this mindreading 
component works is, unlike its existence in some form or another, a contentious issue. I 
30 Following Peter Carruthers, I use the more recently in-vogue term "mindreading" rather than the more 
traditional "theory of mind" to make it clear that the term is useful no matter which stance one takes in 
the theory/simulation debate in psychology.
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will fully explicate my stance on the mindreading debate in Chapter 6.
But for now, to return to the issue at hand, I pose the following question. 
Assuming the existence of an evolved mindreading system, do I believe that you are 
minded or do I merely treat you as minded because it is useful to do so? The answer is 
that this is a false dichotomy: I probably do both. I treat you as minded because it is 
useful to do so and, because it was similarly useful in the evolutionary history of our 
species, my mind forces me to implicitly believe you are minded. I really do honestly 
believe you are minded. Nevertheless, deeper down, the reason I believe is not that I am 
compelled by the evidence that you are minded but only that implicitly believing serves 
an evolutionarily useful anticipatory function.
So the traditional PoOM is strongly upheld in two ways. First, I really do (at least 
implicitly) believe that you are minded and it is reasonable to wonder whether this 
implicit belief can be justified. It is tempting to say that if by some feature of my 
psychology I can't help but believe in other minds then I am eminently justified in 
believing in other minds. After all, what better justification is there for doing something 
than not having any other option? But this is equivocating on justification. In the 
epistemological sense, justification means supporting a belief with evidence that it is true. 
There is thus good reason to hold that my belief is unjustified. 
Which leads me to the second way in which the PoOM is upheld: the concept of 
belief in other minds is dubious by psychological role. Namely, it is evolutionarily useful 
and psychologically mandated that I believe you are minded, yet I do not have conscious 
access to the fact that this belief is held on grounds of utility rather than truth. Because of 
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the psychological role that belief in other minds may play, I cannot take my intuition that 
other minds exist to be in any way indicative of the actual existence of other minds. The 
PoOM is not dissolved but only strengthened by the possibility that I believe in other 
minds for evolutionary-based reasons.
The post-Wittgensteinian rebuttal to the PoOM is similarly challenged by 
mindreading theory. If my understanding of others' behavior proper is being driven by 
interest in utility rather than truth, then my understanding (especially insofar as it is a 
token of the so-called lived position) is open to skepticism. I may connect with others in 
that I interpret their behavior proper to be the same as my behavior proper and thus feel a 
deep human bond. I may be thoroughly and unfailingly convinced that they are minded in 
the same way as myself. I am a person and I interpret them to be a person. But I am still 
interpreting, and moreover likely completely subconsciously interpreting, in order to 
interact better with them (as opposed to interpreting in order to learn the truth), and there 
thus always remains the possibility that I am tricking myself. If it is likely an 
evolutionarily adapted trait of mine that I subconsciously trick myself, then any of my 
attributions of personhood are dubious by psychological role.
The post-Wittgensteinians may have accurately tracked the concept I use when I 
attribute a mind to others, and it very well may be the same concept I use to describe my 
own mind. It does not follow that I am using that concept in accordance with the truth. 
And if I am not using that concept in accordance with the truth, then the classic skeptical 
worries that drive the PoOM are stronger than ever. Indeed, it brings me great utility and 
joy to form bonds with persons, and such bonds rest upon the knowledge that we both are 
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minded, and so why would I ever fail to trick myself when given the opportunity? The 
more persons the better! To frame the claim more in line with the conceptual problem: 
especially given the plausible evolutionary origins of the mindreading faculty, does it not 
still seem likely that I am merely tricking myself into equivocating on the concept of 
mind? How could our bond rely on anything other than the subconscious mutually 
acknowledged white lie that we can somehow know each other as minded persons?
My answer is that this line of reasoning misses the point of both the conceptual 
problem and of Daviesian naturalism. Of course science cannot solve epistemology (or at 
least cannot satisfy the skeptic with an epistemic claim). The classic epistemological 
PoOM is hallowed for a reason: it is the very sort of question that science can never 
answer. There is no scientific evidence that I can imagine convincing the radical solipsist 
of the existence of other minds. But both the conceptual problem as framed by the post-
Wittgensteinians and progressive naturalism as espoused by Davies stress targeting 
underlying concepts for good reason. The conceptual PoOM is not an attempt to argue 
against skeptics regarding other minds, but to coerce them to rethink asking the question 
in the first place. And it is as an aid in this coercion that interdisciplinary work comes in 
handy.
The above argumentation regarding the utility challenge to the PoOM (and indeed 
an overwhelming majority of the history of argumentation regarding the PoOM) assumes 
that other minds are a special kind and then asks how we can know other minds. I, with 
Strawson, take this to be akin to assuming the earth is flat, and then attempting to 
calculate the dimensions of the earth. No matter how refined my measurement 
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instruments and no matter how deep my knowledge of geometry, so long as I assume the 
earth to be flat, my science will not accurately appraise the situation. The task cannot bear 
fruit, and the skeptic will always prevail. To put the same point another way: there is no 
way of solving the epistemological problem on its own terms. However, this thesis 
attempts to show that through solving the conceptual problem of other minds, we can 
dissolve the epistemological problem. It is in dissolution, rather than solution per se, that 
science is useful.
When philosophy asks a question, it is not necessarily the job of science to answer 
that question. Rather, it is the job of the philosopher working with scientific evidence to 
ascertain whether the question is a silly thing to ask. The scientist will never be able to 
satisfy the skeptical epistemologist with her account of a human knowing another 
human's mind. Rather, as we will see in Part III, it is when scientific evidence is used 
alongside philosophy correctly – as a means of testing dubious concepts – that we obtain 
meaningful interdisciplinary results. For the progressive naturalist, the role of science is 
to pave the conceptual path for unhindered philosophical inquiry.
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Part III 
The Naturalistic Approach to the Conceptual Problem
Part I introduced the two problems of other minds, and explicated the post-
Wittgensteinian account. Part II introduced my naturalistic methodology, and explained 
how this methodology might be fruitfully applied to philosophical debates. Now, in Part 
III, I do just that. Chapter 5 applies my methodology to the mental transparency 
assumption, and finds it dubious. This finding means that we lack an adequate account of 
how we believe in our own minds. Chapter 6 explains how, through the mindreading 
module, we believe in other minds. Finally, Chapter 7 introduces Peter Carruthers' 
indirect sensory-access theory of self-knowledge (ISA), which provides the previously 
lacking account of how we believe in our own minds. ISA takes the mindreading module 
detailed in Chapter 6 to explain all belief in minds, whether our own or others'.
Chapter 5
One Believes in One's Own Mind
The statement "I believe that I am minded" is foolish and misleading. I don't 
believe I have a mind. I just have a mind and know I have it by virtue of having it. Such, 
anyway, was the Wittgensteinian gist of my dad's response when he saw that my chapter 
was tentatively titled "I Believe in My Mind". The goal of this chapter is to argue that the 
position my dad exemplifies errs on the side of conceptual conservatism and is dubious 
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both by descent and by psychological role. Despite the universal intuition of mental 
transparency, the existence thereof is not in fact a given. It is only by freeing ourselves of 
the need to premise dubious concepts like mental transparency that we can make progress 
on the PoOM.
For the post-Wittgensteinians, rejecting the Cartesian viewpoint essentially 
involves rejecting substance dualism. While rejecting dualism is important to the 
naturalist cause, it does not go far enough. Descartes' philosophical system hinges on his 
assumption of infallible access to his own self-presenting mental states. For Descartes, 
humans undergoing a given mental state necessarily know that they are undergoing that 
state, and humans who believe they are undergoing a given mental state necessarily are 
undergoing that state. In his forthcoming book The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative 
Theory of Self-Knowledge, Peter Carruthers notes two facts about the cogito that make 
the extent of Descartes' commitment to this mental transparency assumption clear. 
The first is that Descartes' uses of the verb cogitatio refer not to a specific 
reflective kind of thinking but to current propositional attitudes of any kind. Thus cogito  
ergo sum may just as well be translated as "I am in pain, therefore I am" or "I want a 
snack, therefore I am" as "I think, therefore I am." The point is that Descartes is directly 
accessing a mental event, not that he is undergoing the particular mental state of 
reflective philosophical doubt. The second fact is that Descartes does not assume mental 
transparency without questioning the matter, but rather assumes it because he believes not 
only that "the claim didn't require any argument, but that it couldn't be argued for, since it 
forms one of the basic principles of all knowledge and argument. It was, he thought, as 
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obviously true as anything could possibly be."31 32 The idea that he has direct access to 
mental events is clearly and distinctly true.
At least among philosophers, my dad is far from alone in upholding a weak form 
of the Cartesian position in 2011. While few philosophers would endorse the mental 
transparency assumption in as strong a form as Descartes did, there are maybe even fewer 
who would reject it entirely.33 Most working epistemologists and philosophers of mind 
take the existence of mental transparency for granted and jump right to arguing about its 
implications. Upon conducting an informal survey, Carruthers estimates that at least 95% 
of philosophers working on self-knowledge of mental states in the last 40 years uphold 
some version of a weak transparency assumption.34 Nowadays, this assumption is usually 
hashed out in terms of privileged access.35 Privileged access is most importantly a special 
kind of access; my relationship to my mind is fundamentally different from somebody 
else's relationship to my mind. While rarely as bold as the raw Cartesian model, all 
accounts of privileged access preserve some form of a claim to both the infallibility and 
the self-presentation of at least some instances of one's own mental life.
For example, inner sense theory as advanced by Alvin Goldman (2006) holds that 
humans have an introspective module that reliably processes and channels one's own 
31 Carruthers 1,16. The manuscript of The Opacity of Mind starts over numbering pages with each chapter. 
Thus, when citing Carruthers throughout this thesis, I will write “Carruthers [Chapter Number], [Page 
Number].”
32 Carruthers' italics.
33 Indeed, even Wittgenstein, a philosopher most would balk at calling Cartesian in any sense, agrees that 
it is spurious to talk of 'belief' and 'knowledge' with respect to one's own mind. Whereas an other might 
know of or believe in my pain, I do not know or believe my own pain. I simply have it. 
34 Carruthers 1,14
35 There is a sense of privileged access that we are obviously warranted in upholding. We have evidence in 
our own case that we lack in the cases of an other. I can see out of my eyes and hear out of my ears but I 
cannot see out of your eyes or hear out of your ears. So, in this thesis, I am critiquing privileged access 
only insofar as it is a form of mental transparency; i.e. the ability to introspect in a Cartesian manner.
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mental states to that person just as one's visual system processes and channels visual 
images. Goldman's view will be explicated as my primary foil in Chapter 7. Another 
theory, advanced by Richard Moran among others, holds that the expression of the mind 
constitutes the mind itself. For Moran, humans have access to their own mental states not 
by introspection, but by avowal: one actively thinks or says "I want a cookie" and thereby 
commits oneself to wanting a cookie. And, being a rational creature, it is true that one 
does want a cookie.36 It is important to note that, while these theories may seem 
compelling, none of them is perfectly in line with Descartes' clear and distinct intuition. 
The reason the mental transparency assumption was first articulated in Western 
philosophy was the powerful intuition that thoughts are directly, necessarily, and 
immediately self-presenting. This is the same intuition, not of weak and esoteric 
privileged access but of strong immediate transparency, that I take philosophers who 
uphold privileged access to have, and indeed that I myself have.
Whether or not Carruthers' 95% figure is accurate, it is safe to say that a vast 
majority of those theorists who do work directly with the question of knowledge of one's 
own mind remain committed to mental transparency. They take the scientific evidence 
about minds on one hand, and the assumption of privileged access on the other, and 
create theories that reconcile the two. While the way in which we access our own minds 
may be unintuitive (and intuition is, remember, the reason for assuming mental 
transparency in the first place), these theorists remain insistent that knowledge of one's 
own mind is in some sense sometimes direct and non-interpretive, in some sense 
authoritative, and in some sense sometimes different not just in degree but in kind from 
36 Carruthers 1,16
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knowledge of other minds. Those few theorists who completely reject privileged access, 
most notably Gilbert Ryle37, are usually radical behaviorists.
This mass assumption of mental transparency is dubious by descent. Descartes' 
philosophy, despite being groundbreaking, was grounded in theistic ideals. Descartes' 
other core doctrines, such as substance dualism and infinite human free will, are among 
the philosophical and theological concepts most called into doubt, if not outright refuted, 
by progress in science. The preservation of ideals, while very important to Descartes, has 
no place in 21st century naturalistic philosophy. Indeed, Davies stresses that we should 
not only avoid making the preservation of ideals a condition of adequacy on our 
theorizing, but should expect those idealized concepts to be disrupted. When one does 
make dubious concepts like mental transparency antecedent to argument and analysis, as 
most philosophers who discuss privileged access do today, one's argument and analysis 
are fallacious.
Furthermore, the history of the mental transparency assumption shows that the 
position gets weaker and weaker over time. Since Freud, and exponentially since the rise 
of cognitive science, most philosophers have buckled under pressure of the evidence and 
given up claims of Cartesian-strength mental transparency. But even these fervent 
backpedalers have maintained that access to one's own mind is of a special kind (relative 
to one's access to other minds). The attempt to preserve historically demarcated special 
kinds is a hallmark of the conceptual conservatism, and the existence of those special 
kinds is dubious by descent. Given the unintuitive nature of contemporary theories of 
access to one's own mind, most philosophers do not attempt to save the intuition of 
37 See Ryle (1949)
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mental transparency, but instead only the concept. They do not defend the feeling of 
transparent access to their own mental states, but only an alienated idea of that access. It 
thus seems that they attempt to save mental transparency out of conceptual conservatism 
alone.
Nevertheless, contemporary philosophers may actually have an understandable 
reason to attempt to preserve the dubious concept that is privileged access. It is the 
closest they can honestly come to preserving the Cartesian mental transparency intuition 
and they, along with all other humans, may be compelled to intuit transparency by an 
inherent feature of their psychology. Humans may have evolved to unquestioningly 
assume mental transparency. Much like I argued in Chapter 4 regarding the veracity of 
intuitions of belief in other minds, I will now argue that intuitions of mental transparency 
are dubious by psychological role.
The mental transparency assumption not only has a strong influence over the 
course of modern Western philosophy, but across time and place. Carruthers notes the 
influential role the transparency assumption (usually implicitly) plays in Chinese, Indian, 
Aztec, and Shuar thought in order to nod towards the possibility that it might be a human 
universal.38 More specifically Carruthers presents an intriguing, if far from conclusive, 
argument from reverse engineering that the transparency assumption might be built into 
the human mindreading module to serve its own evolutionary function. Carruthers holds 
that one should expect the evolution of an innate mindreading module (which I will argue 
for in Chapter 6) to involve the adoption of an innate intuition of strong Cartesian mental 
transparency. Given the complexity and speed of social interactions, humans need to 
38 Carruthers 1, 5
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assume they know something concrete about the situation at hand in order to socialize 
efficiently. And mental transparency, whether or not it exists, is the simplest and most 
powerful streamlining assumption humans can make.
To underscore the plausibility that the transparency assumption is innate, take the 
famous Gazzaniga (1978) commissurotomy experiments. These experiments indicate that 
humans assume mental transparency even when we know that our brain has been 
damaged in such a way as to deny access to certain of our own mental events. 
Commissurotomy (or split-brain) patients have had surgery that separates the two 
hemispheres of their brain so that they do not interact. The left hemisphere of the brain is 
where the language faculty is housed, and thus the hemisphere to which split-brain 
patients have access when speaking. Split-brain patients generally have a very good 
understanding of their surgery and the fact that there exists mental information in their 
minds that they cannot consciously access.
In one of Gazzaniga's studies revealing the overriding nature of the transparency 
assumption, a split-brain patient's right eye's field of vision (and thus left hemisphere) 
was shown a chicken claw and his left field of vision (right hemisphere) was shown a 
picture of a snowy scene. His full field of vision was then shown many diverse objects, 
and the patient was instructed to point at the objects that related to what he had seen 
before. Predictably, the hand controlled by the left hemisphere chose a chicken and the 
hand controlled by the right hemisphere chose a snow shovel. The experimenter then 
asked the patient to explain his choices. The patient confidently and immediately replied 
that he chose the chicken because of the claw, and the shovel to clean out the chicken 
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coop.
To iterate, the patient knew, and could explain, that his corpus callosum had been 
severed and that he could not access certain information in his own mind. But he did not, 
and split-brain patients never did in Gazzaniga's myriad experiments, appeal to his 
condition and the fact that he might not be able to access the reason he chose the shovel. 
Plausibly because of a built-in transparency assumption, the patient truly believed that he 
knew for certain why he had chosen the shovel. In fact he did not know, but was 
subconsciously interpreting his own action. No wonder it was clear and distinct to 
Descartes that his mental life was transparent to him: humans might have evolved to 
unquestioningly believe it. It was clear and distinct to Gazzaniga's patient that he had 
chosen the shovel in order to clean out the coop, and he was wrong.
This effect is not only present in people with brain damage. Indeed, there is a vast 
amount of research that shows subjects interpreting their own mental states and then 
assuming to have transparently introspected them.39 For example, Wells and Petty (1980) 
show that people interpret themselves as agreeing with something merely because they 
happen to be nodding as it is being said. In this classic study, one group of subjects was 
informed that they were engaging in product testing by nodding their heads as they 
listened to a tape through headphones. The other group was instructed to shake their 
heads while listening to the same tape. When questioned afterward, members of the 
nodding group were significantly more likely to believe the things said on the tape than 
were members of the headshaking group.
39 Some more of this literature will be examined in Chapter 7. For yet more, see Wilson (2002), Wegner 
(2002), and Carruthers Chapter 10.
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Despite knowing that they were nodding or headshaking only in order to follow 
instructions, the subjects unconsciously took their own nodding or headshaking as 
evidence that they had a strong stance on what they heard. A number of control 
experiments have been done to rule out other explanations, such as the possibility that 
nodding simply makes one more agreeable.40 In fact, we interpret ourselves nodding in 
exactly the same way as we interpret others nodding, even when we are explicitly aware 
that we are nodding for a different (and trivial) reason. And, once again, it is clear and 
distinct to us that our interpretation is in fact an introspection, and we are dead wrong.
I have by no means produced enough evidence to warrant renouncing the 
transparency assumption. Some version of an inner sense or other theory of knowledge of 
one's own mental states may turn out to be true, and the dubious concept of privileged 
access may very well be saved. However, especially given the extreme conceptual 
conservative faith usually implicitly upholding mental transparency, I do believe I have at 
least given enough reason to doubt that it is necessarily the case. I have also given 
grounds that one plausible alternate hypothesis to consider is that mental transparency is 
best explained as an illusion produced by a mechanism of our psychology.
The concept of privileged access is dubious by descent and the intuition of mental 
transparency is dubious by psychological role. Hence, in line with Davies' naturalist 
directives, we should bracket the concept of mental transparency and explore what we 
actually do know about our own access to our own mind before theorizing about that 
access. And then that theorizing should not take mental transparency to be a premise, but 
as one of several possible conclusions. There is a belief about my own mind, as about 
40 See Briñol and Petty (2003) and Carruthers 10,16
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other minds, that needs justification. Indeed, it is plausible that, whether by force of 
social indoctrination or evolutionary psychological function, I cannot help but believe in 
my own mind. Justification of that belief with regards to truth is thus all the more 
important, and while that justification may well end up being mental transparency, it 
should not be assumed that it is so.
If our best science does not point towards the existence of mental transparency 
then, because we are not assuming it to exist, we should not take it to exist. In the 
remainder of Part III I defend the claim that Carruthers' Indirect Sensory-Access Theory 
of Self-Knowledge (ISA) is our best scientific theory of self-knowledge. ISA does not 
take mental transparency to exist, and thus, I will argue, neither should we.
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Chapter 6
One Believes in Other Minds
As touched on earlier, mindreading is the human capacity to attribute mindedness. 
The two main strands of mindreading theory are called 'theory theory' and 'simulation 
theory'. Theory theorists hold that children are like little scientists who, through trial and 
error, construct a scientific theory about the existence of other minds which they actively 
use in attributing mental states. Simulation theorists, on the other hand, hold that humans 
understand other minds by learning to simulate others' minds in their own minds. They 
take what they know about a given situation and, barring any conflicting information they 
know the other to possess, simply attribute their own mental processes to the other. Both 
theory theory and simulation theory require a great deal of (and thus time spent) learning 
before mindreading can become operational. Theory theorists must learn to whom it is 
appropriate to attribute what sorts of mental states, and simulation theorists must learn 
whom to simulate.
While there is a huge amount of literature on the theory/simulation debate, I will 
not go into detail regarding the merits of theory theory versus simulation theory because 
in the end I will take some understanding of each theory to be correct. What follows is a 
survey of core mindreading research which inductively supports a third account of 
mindreading: that humans possess an innate mindreading module. A module, in cognitive 
science, is "a specialized function-specific processing system with its own specific neural 
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realization."41 Thus, my position42 is that the human mind has evolved a specialized 
systemic capacity to, through both learning and simulation, formulate belief in and 
understanding of mental states.43
The most widely accepted claim regarding the mindreading capacity is that 
normally-functioning humans acquire an understanding of other minds around the age of 
four. This claim is supported by abundant research on children's ability to pass false-
belief and misleading-appearance tasks. For example, in a much-discussed experiment by 
Wimmer and Perner (1983), experimenters act out a story for children. In the story, Sally 
places a marble in a basket. Sally then leaves, and while she is gone Anne moves the 
marble to a box. Children are asked either where Sally will look for her marble when she 
returns, or just where Sally thinks her marble is. In both cases normally developing four 
year old children typically pass such tasks and point towards or verbally indicate the 
basket. Three year olds, along with much older autistic children, typically fail the task 
and point towards or verbally indicate the box. These results have been replicated and 
confirmed across experimental paradigms with tasks testing varied false beliefs among 
children from varied countries, cultures, and ethnic groups, and as such are almost always 
taken as canon by theory, simulation, and module theorists alike.44 It is just about as close 
to known as scientifically possible that humans, from the age of 4 on, believe in other 
41 Carruthers 7, 5
42 Informed by the modular mindreading accounts put forward by Leslie (1994 and 2004) and Baron-
Cohen (1995).
43 Leading modular accounts of mindreading, including the one I espouse in this thesis, actually posit a 2 
system mindreading faculty. Humans engage in both immediate intuitive mindreading, of the 
unconscious sort discussed extensively in this thesis, and slower reflective mindreading, which might 
actually be a conscious process. For the sake of brevity I do not go into 2 system mindreading in this 
thesis, but for a full account of its implications for (and the support it lends to) Carruthers' theory see 
Carruthers Chapter 7.
44 Leslie (2004) 528
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minds.
Nonetheless, a new research paradigm has begun to produce results that strongly 
suggest that children much younger than four years old have the ability to discern false 
belief in others. Rene Baillargeon notes that traditional investigations into children's 
false-belief understanding, such as the Sally-Anne experiment, rely on elicited-response 
tasks in which the children verbally respond to verbal prompts which reveal their 
understanding of the mental states at play.45 The new paradigm, on the other hand, uses 
what Baillargeon terms spontaneous-response tasks rather than elicited-response tasks. 
These tasks do not depend on children's explicit responses to experimenter's verbal 
prompts, but rather study children's understanding of false belief by noting the behaviors 
with which the children spontaneously respond to a situation. One particularly well 
supported type of spontaneous-response task, the violation-of-expectation task, studies 
whether infants gaze longer when they observe actions incompatible with actors' false 
beliefs. 
For example, research by Surian et alia (2007) shows that 13-month-old infants 
use their mindreading capacities to attribute false belief about the location of an object, 
and attribute belief to caterpillars as well as to humans. In this study, there were two 
screens, one hiding an apple and the other hiding a wedge of cheese. The infants first 
witnessed several familiarization trials in which the caterpillar watched the experimenter 
hide the foods and then consistently went for its preferred treat. Then, in the experimental 
trial, the foods were hidden in opposite locations before the caterpillar entered the scene. 
The infants gazed significantly and reliably longer when the caterpillar, whom they had 
45 Baillargeon et alia 110
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witnessed to prefer one type of food over the other, did not return to the original location 
of the preferred food. The infants mistakenly attributed a false-belief to the bug.
Another type of spontaneous-response task, the anticipatory-looking task, studies 
whether an infant's gaze anticipates where an actor with a false belief about the location 
of an object will look for that object. For example, Southgate et alia (2007) used a non-
verbal anticipatory-looking task to discover whether 25-month-olds anticipate the actions 
of a person with a false belief. In familiarization trials, a bear puppet hid a toy in one of 
two boxes while the actor looked on, and the actor then opened a door corresponding 
with the correct box from which to retrieve the toy. In the experimental trial, the actor 
once again looked on while the bear puppet hid the toy in a box, but, after the toy was 
hidden, was distracted by a ringing telephone and looked away. While the actor was 
looking away, the bear puppet removed the toy from the box and left the stage with it. 
When the phone ceased to ring and the actor turned back to the stage, the infant correctly 
anticipated the actor's behavior and gazed at the box where the infant took the actor to 
falsely believe the toy was hidden.
These studies, along with the many others in this ever-growing research 
paradigm46, indicate that children have an active mindreading capacity by not the fourth, 
but the second year of life, if not much earlier. And the earlier in human life the 
mindreading faculty is found to be active the more support there is for a modular account, 
because both theory theory and simulation theory require a significant amount of learning 
time before they can take children to be able to mindread. But before any claims about 
46 See Baillargeon et alia (2010), Onishi (2005 and 2007), Scott (2009 and in press), and Song (2008a and 
2008b) for yet more spontaneous-response studies.
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the ramifications of infant mindreading can be persuasive, there is an obvious concern to 
address. Namely, why is there such a large gap between ability to perform in 
spontaneous-response and elicited-response tasks? Why, if one can mindread by the 13th 
month of life, does it take that same child until the fourth year to report that ability?
Baillargeon et alia (2010) propose what they term the "response account" to 
describe why children who can mindread nonetheless fail elicited-response mindreading 
tasks. The response account states that elicited-response tasks require people to carry out 
three distinct processes. The child must first engage in false-belief-representation. She 
must understand the false-belief without conflating it with her own belief. Secondly, the 
child must engage in response-selection and access the understood false-belief in order to 
select her response. She must select, from among all possible responses, that response 
which takes into account the facts that she understands the false-belief and is answering 
as if she were the other. Finally, the child must engage in response-inhibition and inhibit 
any urge to respond with her own belief rather than the false-belief of the other.47
In spontaneous-response tasks, on the other hand, infants must only engage in 
false-belief-representation and they automatically behave in such a way as to 
spontaneously give away their understanding of the false belief. The response account 
thus argues that, until the age of four, children are overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
multi-step elicited-response requirements. Baillargeon reports that findings in 
neuroscience support this account, suggesting "that (1) the right temporo-parietal junction 
plays an important role in the false-belief-representation process, (2) regions of the 
anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex play an important role in the response-selection 
47 Baillargeon et alia 114
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process, and (3) the connections between the frontal and temporal brain regions mature 
later and more slowly than other connections." The response-selection process has 
difficulty accessing the false-belief-representation process in the immature toddler brain, 
and children younger than four thus predictably pass spontaneous tasks but fail response 
tasks.48
Carruthers introduces another factor that helps explain the gap between 
mindreading and the report thereof: epistemic vigilance. As an infant, a child has no need 
for a high degree of epistemic vigilance in communication, as she is likely to only 
interact with primary caregivers, and primary caregivers are highly unlikely to harmfully 
lie to her.49 Indeed, in order to learn something as multifaceted as a native language at so 
early an age the child must take everything at facevalue, or else get lost in complexity. 
And in an insulated loving community false-belief is a conversational nonstarter. It is 
only once the child's social circle starts to broaden and she interacts with other children 
and less trustworthy adults that falsehood gains an important role in conversation. Once 
this happens, the child's epistemic vigilance rapidly rises, and around the age of four she 
is fully linguistically equipped to competently discuss false belief. Hence late-signing 
deaf children experience a delay in acquiring the ability to perform in elicited-response 
tasks because they interact with non-caregivers later than normal children.50 Likewise, 
children with older siblings acquire an early ability to perform in elicited-response tasks 
because they cannot trust their brothers and sisters from the start.51 All of these children 
are equipped with a working mindreading module from at least 13 months of age, if not 
48 Baillargeon et alia 115
49 Carruthers 9, 27
50 Carruthers 9, 28
51 ibid
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from birth, but they start to use it in active communication at varied times based on their 
individual social situation.
False-belief understanding in infants, in addition to making an innate modular 
account of mindreading plausible, also makes it unlikely that mindreading is housed in 
the language module. Theorists such as Gordon (1986) and de Villiers (2007) have long 
argued, from both simulation theory and theory theory standpoints, that mindreading is 
simply an offshoot of language acquisition. But infants can both mindread before they 
can speak and speak without being able to report mindreading. While the development of 
language might play a role in being able to report mindreading by the age of 4, 
Baillargeon's work indicates that the mindreading module develops earlier than the 
language module. Varley's (1998 and 2001) agrammatic aphasia studies underscore this 
objection to the claim that mindreading and language are produced by a singular module. 
These studies show that patients who have undergone severe left brain hemisphere 
damage and have lost almost all linguistic competence nonetheless pass false-belief tasks. 
So the two modules can operate distinctly, at the very least.52
If mindreading is indeed modular then, as the language module can be damaged or 
absent, the mindreading module should similarly be damaged or absent in certain 
humans. A great deal of work on the performance of autistic people on mindreading tasks 
suggests that autism might be what constitutes just such damage or absence. Simon 
Baron-Cohen goes so far as to claim that the behavioral impairments that characterize 
autism can all be traced to impairment of the mindreading system. Baron-Cohen terms 
52 Carruthers 7, 3
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the autistic person's lack of a capacity to mindread "mindblindness."53
Numerous studies have shown that autistic children are unable to pass elicited-
response false-belief tasks until the age of nine, and often are unable to pass more subtle 
mindreading tasks, such as understanding irony, their entire lives.54 Furthermore, once 
able to pass mindreading tasks, there is ample evidence that autistic people do so not by 
mindreading but by following heuristics they have devised in order to get by without a 
mindreading faculty.55 For example, Senju et alia (2009) showed that adult autistic people 
fail the same anticipatory looking tasks that the bear puppet experiment proved two year 
old normal functioning humans pass. Without being specifically prompted to respond 
appropriately, the autistic person does not have the opportunity to employ the makeshift 
heuristics she plausibly uses to make up for her mindblindness.56 This evidence is not 
quite strong enough to be sure that what makes autistic people autistic is a lack of or 
impaired mindreading module. But there is, as far as I am aware, nothing in the evidence 
that runs counter to the claim.
There is also a large amount of experimental data on the mindreading capacities 
of chimpanzees and other primates. If an evolutionary modular account of mindreading is 
right, then the evidence should show that chimpanzees (along with other highly-social 
primates and even some types of birds) have a more rudimentary but similarly 
functioning mindreading module. Call and Tomasello (2008), upon reviewing the 30 
years of research on chimpanzee mindreading since Premack and Woodruff's seminal 
1978 "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?", find that the evidence is in line with 
53 Baron-Cohen 1
54 Carruthers 9, 9
55 Perhaps theory theory holds true for people lacking modular mindreading ability.
56 Carruthers 9, 10.
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just such a conclusion. In particular, while chimpanzees consistently fail false-belief 
tasks, they do nonetheless engage in a more limited form of mindreading. 
Chimps, like humans, come to understand others not just in terms of behavior but 
in terms of the goals, intentions, perceptions and knowledge underlying that behavior. 
When competing with others for food, the apes take into account a whole range of mental 
states. For example, Hare and Tomasello (2006) had chimpanzees compete for food with 
a human inside a glass booth. The chimps chose to approach the food along the side of 
the booth that featured an opaque barrier blocking the human's line of vision. In an 
extension of that experiment conducted by Melis et alia (2006), the chimps accessed the 
food by choosing to go through a tunnel that featured a more or less silent door over 
choosing a tunnel that featured a noisy door. Chimps understand what their fellow 
foodmongers can and cannot see and hear and, when it is to their advantage to do so, act 
in order to trick others.
The particularly strong capacities of the human mindreading system, and the ways 
in which humans use mindreading in complex social interactions, lead some researchers 
to hold that human mindreading is distinct from mindreading in other animals in that it is 
centered on empathy. Following the research of Tomasello among others, anthropologist 
and primatologist Sarah Hrdy holds that the key to the principle difference between 
humans and other apes lies in the mindreading module. Despite nearly identical cognitive 
abilities, humans, when compared with other apes, simply pay much more attention to 
what other individuals are thinking and feeling, and, perhaps even more tellingly, are 
much more eager to share and cooperate with other individuals. 
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Hrdy's 2009 book Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual  
Understanding espouses an account of evolved human nature that takes empathy to be 
central to humanness. She advances the argument that the mindreading module first 
evolved during Pleistocene era, around the same time as the emergence of the first 
species under the genus homo. Human babies take a very long time to become self-
sufficient, and their hunting-gathering parents often could not provide for and protect 
them on their own. Thus, supplementing parenting with regular alloparenting – the act of 
parenting by non-biological parents – became the norm among very early humans.57 And 
alloparenting only occurred because humans were able to see other humans as minded, 
and thus worth protecting. The very earliest hunting and gathering societies only 
successfully produced large, vulnerable, and slow-maturing offspring by virtue of 
empathic alloparental care made possible by the mindreading module. So, according to 
Hrdy, thousands of years before the advent of anatomically- and emotionally-modern 
humans, a particular empathic mindreading capacity distinguished early members of the 
homo genus from other apes. 
A widespread anthropological view is that what sets humans apart from other 
animals is the language faculty. Hrdy posits that human specialness also, or even instead, 
might be due to a more advanced capacity for mindreading.58 The Baillargeon studies 
certainly indicate that language and mindreading modules are distinct, and thus that the 
specialness of human mindreading is not merely a byproduct of the specialness of human 
language. Regardless, the evolutionary advantages of mindreading, and in particular of 
57 Hrdy 176
58 Hrdy 3
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mindreading being innate and modular in nature, are obvious. It is immensely plausible 
that humankind developed the ability to mindread primarily because it was useful for 
forming tightknit extended families which made the rearing of slow-maturing children 
possible.
To summarize, the best inductive conclusion to draw from the abundant evidence 
on the mindreading capacity is that it is an evolved innate module by which humans 
subconsciously assign mental states to others. And honestly assigning mental states to 
others is only humanly possible if one believes in the minds of those others. Thus, the 
mindreading module is the biological impetus for belief in other minds. The problem of 
other minds is the problem of justifying those beliefs that are produced by the 
mindreading module.
In Chapter 5 I determined that we believe in our own minds, and that this belief 
(because the mental transparency assumption is dubious) is one that needs justification. 
In this chapter I explained how we believe in other minds, and noted that this belief is 
what the PoOM claims needs justification. In Chapter 7 I will tie Chapters 5 and 6 
together and argue that how we believe in other minds is exactly how we believe in our 
own minds. In Part IV I will argue that the implication of this fact for the PoOM is that 
our belief in other minds requires no differential justification than our belief in our own 
minds.
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Chapter 7
One Believes that Others are Minded in the Same Way as Oneself
The above chapter title is stated ambiguously in order to point out that 
philosophers dealing with the conceptual problem have consistently equivocated on two 
very different meanings of the statement. Put this way, the title could be taken, as the 
conceptual problem is traditionally taken, to mean that the concept of mind attributed to 
oneself is the same as the concept of mind attributed to others. This is P3 in the argument 
that motivates the PoOM from Chapter 2 . But it could also mean that the way by which 
one believes oneself to be minded is the same as the way by which one believes others to 
be minded (this is what, for the post-Wittgensteinians, undermines P5). The latter is what 
the post-Wittgensteinians argue, while at times claiming to argue for the former.  But 
showing the latter does not necessarily amount to showing the former. After all, I might 
attribute mindedness to a cat or robot using the same mindreading methods I use to 
attribute mindedness to a human adult, but it is not clear that I am attributing the same 
concept of mind to each subject. 
Thus, it falls to my analysis of the relevant sciences not only to support the post-
Wittgensteinian claim that the way in which minds are perceived is univocal, but also that 
the perceived minds are themselves conceptualized univocally. But I am getting ahead of 
myself. In this chapter I will argue that the psychological and neuroscientific evidence 
strongly suggests that the way by which one believes – namely the psychological 
mechanism that is mindreading – is univocal. In Chapter 8 I will address whether 
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knowing that the mechanisms that prompt belief in one's own mind and others' minds are 
one and the same is sufficient evidence with which to solve the true conceptual problem 
of other minds.
A claim regarding the equivalence of the mechanisms by which one believes in 
the two “kinds” of mind (mine and others') must obviously start with what is known 
about the mechanism at work in each kind of belief. In Chapter 6 I explained that the 
mindreading module is the mechanism by which we believe in other minds. I also 
explained, in Chapter 5, that the transparency assumption is not necessarily a good 
account of the way in which we believe in our own minds. Thus, it now falls to me to 
explain an acceptable account of the mechanism by which we believe in our own minds 
which does not premise the transparency assumption. In doing so I will explicate what I 
take to be the most thorough and convincing account of knowledge of one's own mind: 
Carruthers' indirect sensory-access theory (ISA). ISA takes transparent access to 
propositional attitudes to not exist and the module by which one believes in one's own 
mind to be the mindreading module itself. Upon examining the relevant scientific 
evidence, I will conclude that Carruthers' is the altogether best available theory and that it 
is thus plausible that the way by which one believes oneself to be minded is the exact 
same as the way by which one believes others to be minded.
Alvin Goldman (2006) is Carruthers' main competitor with regards to theories of 
self-knowledge. Goldman's simulationist inner sense theory takes transparent access to 
propositional attitudes to exist. For Goldman, humans possess a special channel of 
introspective access to their own mental states. Moreover, as Goldman is a simulation 
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theorist, he holds that attributions of mental states to others are also grounded in 
introspection. Humans use their introspective module to simulate others' perspectives and 
mental states. As Carruthers notes, for Goldman “the final step in each episode of 
mindreading is to identify the mental state in oneself with which the simulative process 
has concluded, and then to attribute that mental state to the other person.”59 Because one 
must be capable of self-knowledge before simulating other-knowledge, Goldman must 
maintain that the human capacity for self-knowledge evolved before the capacity for 
other-knowledge, and that it must emerge significantly earlier in development. As we will 
see, Carruthers challenges both of these points.
On the positive side of things, Carruthers' ISA theory comprises two claims. 
Firstly, the human mind contains a single faculty that is responsible for the attribution of 
all mental states. The mindreading faculty, by means of interpretation, is the source of 
self-knowledge as well as other-knowledge. Secondly, the inputs to this mindreading 
faculty are all, broadly construed60, perceptual in nature. Some sensory states which 
constitute perception are thus introspective and non-interpretive, but the vast majority of 
mental states, including propositional attitudes of the sort detected in mindreading tasks, 
are second-hand and interpretive. I will now further explicate and give evidence to 
substantiate both of these claims.
The first claim relies heavily on arguments from reverse engineering. As I noted 
in Chapter 6, there are good evolutionary reasons for human beings to have evolved a 
mindreading module. Effective communication with and empathy for fellow humans 
59 Carruthers 6, 6
60 Broadly construed in that perception here includes proprioception (the sense of the relative position of 
neighboring parts of one's body) and interoception (sense that is stimulated from within one's body) 
along with visual imagery and inner speech.
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greatly increases one's fitness and ability to produce and raise offspring, and this held 
especially true in hunter-gatherer societies. Sarah Hrdy shows that there is good evidence 
that 3rd person mindreading evolved very early in human development, probably during 
the early Pleistocene.61
Conversely, there is no evolutionary reason, or at least no reason that seems 
powerful enough to be selected for, for a standalone introspective inner sense module to 
have evolved before the ability to mindread others. Goldman certainly gives no such 
reason. Rather, it is much more likely that the ability to express one's own mental states 
is, albeit an arguably very important adaptation in human evolutionary history, merely an 
afterthought of a mindreading capacity originally geared towards other minds. 
Furthermore, alongside its redundancy with the mindreading faculty, there are well-
supported neuroscientific considerations that count against the likelihood that humans 
evolved an introspective faculty.
For one, there is the simple fact that neural connections take a lot of energy and 
nutrients to build and maintain.62 The brain only has so many resources to go around, and 
it does not make much sense to devote a great deal of them to introspection when co-
option of the already evolved mindreading module is nearly as effective at self-ascribing 
mental states. A second consideration is that non-sensory conceptual modules are 
physically located all over the place in the brain, rather than in one spot from which they 
could all be pipelined to consciousness.63 An introspective faculty would require its own 
complicated and expensive physical manifestation in the brain. And there would have to 
61 Hrdy 283
62 See Aiello and Wheeler (1995)
63 Carruthers 2, 16
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be one or more expensive physical channels connecting the inner sense module to  the 
conceptual systems dispersed around the brain (from the frontal lobes that form 
judgments, to the premoter cortices that form intentions, et cetera). There would hence 
have to be very compelling evolutionary pressures to evolve an inner sense module. And 
leading inner sense theorists have not, to date, offered accounts of any such pressures.
Much less taxing, and thus much more likely to have evolved under weak 
evolutionary pressures, is the presence of an innate transparency assumption built into the 
3rd person mindreading capacity (as argued for in Chapter 5). With the intuition of 
transparency assumption in place, 1st person mindreading of the sort ISA predicts only 
requires turning one's mindreading attention and interpretation on oneself. While an 
argument towards evolutionary parsimony such as this one is never completely 
persuasive, it is quite compelling until (if ever) relevant evidence against it comes to 
light. No such evidence – in this case concrete findings of anything in neuroscience or 
psychology which highlights a distinct introspective capacity – is on offer. That the 
appeal to evolutionary parsimony integrates with current work in neuroscience bolsters 
its credibility.
One prevalent objection to ISA is that I am much more confident in dealing with 
my own propositional attitudes than those of others. I do not face the sorts of ambiguities 
and confusions that arise in communication with others when thinking about my own 
statements. And I often feel like I am involved in interpretation when ascribing mental 
states to others, but rarely when ascribing them to myself. But the ISA account should not 
find these claims surprising. That I use one faculty to mindread both myself and others is 
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not to deny that I am better at mindreading myself than others. The process being the 
same does not entail equally sound results when the inputs can differ so substantially. 
After all, the mindreading faculty has a great deal more evidence at hand when attributing 
mental states to myself. Visual imagery, previous inner speech (i.e. verbal thought), and 
bodily feelings are all modes of perception that aid in self-mindreading and not in other-
mindreading.64 But note that they aid, as in help interpret, as opposed to constitute the 
mindreading. I do not simply come to know my own mind by way of the ample evidence 
I have access to (that I do not have about other minds), but rather just more accurately 
interpret what might be going on in my own mind. I should be more confident in my 
conclusions, as I have more to work with.
Moreover, especially in conjunction with the built-in transparency assumption, 
self-interpretation is often self-fulfilling. I can misinterpret my own belief, but that 
misinterpretation readily becomes my new belief (and subsequent evocations of that 
belief are actually correct interpretations). I am under the thrall of the transparency 
assumption, and as such often take my interpretation of my belief as gospel. I am 
thoroughly convinced that my interpretation was introspection, and therefore henceforth 
will really believe that which I formerly may or may not have really believed. 
Gazzaniga's patient did not select the shovel to clean the chicken coop, but he does now 
really believe that he selected it for that reason, and if shown a chicken coop in the future 
his true object of choice may well be a shovel. So, I am confident in my interpretations of 
64 It might be argued that this counts as privileged access. And it does, in the broad sense: I have access to 
evidence no one else does. But it does not count as Cartesian privileged access in that it is not in any 
way at any time infallible nor self-presenting to consciousness. It is not the sort of privileged access that 
vindicates the mental transparency assumption and drives the classic epistemological problem of other 
minds.
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myself not only because they are well founded, but because I am not even aware they are 
interpretations. The fact that I generally do not doubt my understanding of my own 
beliefs only goes to show that I, like Descartes, am highly prone to assume I have 
transparent access to my mental states. It does not show that I do in fact have transparent 
access.
There probably, understandably, remains some confusion regarding the distinction 
between what may or may not have access, and what that thing may or may not have 
access to. If I interpret my own mind, and especially if I often err when doing so, what 
exactly differentiates the 'I' that interprets and the 'I' that is interpreted? Are my conscious 
self and my nonconscious self somehow, like Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde, different 
beings altogether? These questions lead me to the second claim of ISA: that the inputs to 
the mindreading module are all perceptual in nature. To elucidate this matter, Carruthers 
appeals to Bernard Baars' (1989) global broadcast model of the mind. Global workspace 
theory, as proposed and defended by Baars, has been widely accepted as an accurate 
account of mental processes and access consciousness.65
Baars bases his global broadcast model on the blackboard analogy popular in 
artificial intelligence research. The basic idea of the model is that the mind is organized 
around a common workspace and that information from this workspace is globally 
broadcast to all the various processing systems throughout the brain. Imagine specialists 
in all of the domains of knowledge gathering in a room with a blackboard and 
contributing information to that blackboard without directly interacting with one another. 
The specialists, on this analogy, are all of the sensory systems of the mind: vision, 
65 See Shanahan (2006), Dehaene (2001 and 2007), Baars (2010), and Carruthers Chapter 2.
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hearing, touch, taste, smell, bodily feeling, visual imagery, inner speech, and so on. 
These various means of perception globally broadcast the information they have 
processed (so that, for example, the language module has access to what the body has 
heard so that it can do its job). The blackboard is the site of consciousness. For Baars, “all 
and only the contents of global broadcasts are conscious, and the fact of their being 
broadcast explains their conscious status.”66 67
There is no higher-order executive system that controls who writes what on the 
blackboard. Rather, the specialists independently compete for access68 to the means to 
globally broadcast their ideas, and their information is filtered only by themselves. The 
specialists write what they have gleaned from their research – thus, as vision science 
confirms, the visual system does not simply relay photographic images to the mind but 
rather processes and interprets visual information and relays a heavily doctored account 
of its inputs69 – on the board, and in doing so make information available both to 
consciousness and to various cognitive processing systems in the brain. This writing on 
the board constitutes low-level conscious awareness.
The conscious mental event (the token writing on the board) also acts as an input 
for a number of nonconscious modules, including conceptual, affective, and executive 
systems. These systems might too be represented by specialists in the room, but they do 
not directly contribute information to the blackboard. Rather, they read the blackboard, 
use the information there for their own purposes, and then tell their findings to the 
original specialists. The original specialists, meanwhile, while continuing to write their 
66 Carruthers 2, 2
67 Carruthers' italics
68 For an account of this competition, see Desimone and Duncan (1995)
69 See Nijhawan (1997)
59
own findings on the board, also jot down compelling information from these secondary 
specialists. So not only are the perceptual systems the only parts of the mind that directly 
feed consciousness, but other systems act on consciousness only by going through 
perception (usually in the form of visual images or inner speech). Perceptual information 
fed into the mind by sensory systems produces a conscious event and a global broadcast 
to the various processing centers of the mind. This information sparks nonconscious 
processing in conceptual systems that feeds back into sensory systems and issues in 
further conscious events. This process continues ad infinitum and constitutes the so called 
stream of consciousness.
The mindreading module makes sense as a second-level conceptual faculty. The 
mindreader is a specialist who does not herself write on the blackboard, but who 
interprets information on the blackboard and whispers her interpretation into the ears of 
the scribe specialists. Hence, as ISA entails, all of the inputs to the mindreading faculty 
are perceptual in nature: they are all provided by the original set of specialists. Further, 
the information uncovered by the mindreading faculty, for example the belief that Sally 
will mistakenly look for the marble in the basket, is only broadcast in sensory clothing. 
So, I do not actively consciously believe that Sally will look in the basket, but see that 
she last saw the marble in the basket, which my mindreading module interprets as 
believing that Sally will look in the basket. My mindreading module then tells my inner 
speech faculty to broadcast the feeling that I believe that Sally will look in the basket. 
This feeling is literally an object: a token image of, for example, the inner speech 
fragment 'Sally will look in the basket.' Images make use of the same cognitive 
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mechanisms as perception, and are thus globally broadcast in the same exact manner.70 
All conscious beliefs about the mental states of others (and ourselves) are in fact only 
images – processed perceptions – of the unconscious beliefs produced by the 
mindreading module.
FIGURE A71: The Global Broadcast System.
Sensory information from the eyes, ears, et cetera is fed into sensory systems, which process, package, and 
relay information to the global broadcast workspace and consciousness. Notice that the only systems that 
feed into global broadcast (the greyed area labeled “Workspace”) are sensory systems. Global broadcast 
then distributes the sensory information to various executive, conceptual and affective systems throughout 
the mind. The mindreading module is one of these conceptual systems. These systems process the 
information and relay it further around the mind. However, before the conceptually processed information 
is ever relayed back into global broadcast (and thus consciousness), it is always sent back through the 
sensory systems. The sensory systems package the information into perceptual form, and feed the packaged 
information into global broadcast and consciousness, starting the cycle over again.
70 See Kosslyn (1994)
71 Adapted from Carruthers Figure 2.1
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Because all of the conceptual information produced by the mindreading module is 
processed by sensory systems before reaching consciousness, it is only this processed 
perception of a feeling that I believe, desire or intend something – rather than a 'pure' 
belief, desire or intention – that is accessible to consciousness. To clarify this point, 
remember the visual system once again. My vision is not photographic; not simply an 
exposure of the latent image captured from the reflection of light. My visual images are 
not real-time reproductions of what my eyes see. Rather, my visual systems process what 
my eyes see, adapt that information into images that are useful for navigating the 
situation at hand, and then globally broadcast these preprocessed images.72  Inner images 
of propositional attitudes are preprocessed by my sensory systems in the exact same way. 
Davies notes that “naive realism concerning our vision ... is out of the question.”73 So too 
is naïve realism concerning our own propositional attitudes.
Consciousness is thus, in a sense, passive. It simply is the relaying of 
nonconsciously preprocessed information. I do not consciously do anything; 
consciousness is simply an awareness of the things I do. For another example, as I type I 
do not consciously believe I am wearing pants. I sense that I am wearing pants and this 
sensation, after being processed by my sensory systems, is globally broadcast.. And my 
mindreading system interprets this broadcast sensory information and leads me to believe 
I am wearing pants. But I do not have direct conscious access to this belief. Instead, the 
belief is fed back through and processed by my sensory systems before reaching 
consciousness. Consciously, I have only the sensation of believing that I am wearing 
72 Davies 118
73 Davies 119
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pants.
Notice, here, the likelihood that concepts dubious by psychological role arise from 
the global broadcast system. I do not consciously stride forth and define my concepts 
such that they accord with the truth as best as I can fathom it. I do not even believe that I 
am wearing pants because of a conscious review of the evidence. Rather, I am simply 
imagistically informed by my unconscious mind that I believe I am wearing pants, or that 
I believe that I am the conceptual center of the universe. And, because all of my cognitive 
faculties that serve as various inputs to the global broadcast system are evolved modules, 
I have very little ground for holding that they point me towards the truth. Rather, they 
point me towards what is evolutionarily most useful for me to consciously think I believe. 
Thus, every concept that they do point me toward, no matter how powerfully they point, 
is likely dubious by psychological role.
All information that is globally broadcast is sensory, as consciousness is purely 
sensory. This is not to say that all perception is globally broadcast. Not all, or indeed 
most, information available to the specialists is written on the blackboard. Rather, some 
sensation never reaches conscious awareness yet nonetheless affects nonconscious 
modules. This fact has been amply proven by priming experiments in psychology. Take 
the famous Bargh, Chen, and Burrows experiment (1996) in which subjects were 
ostensibly in the lab to complete a language task. Half of these subjects were given a 
language task, and the other half were given the same task with keywords swapped out 
for words clearly pertaining to the elderly. Upon completing the task, the subjects were 
told they were free to go, and walked out of the lab, down the hallway, and to the elevator 
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which led to the exit. A confederate of the experimenter sat in the hallway, pretending to 
be the next subject in line, and surreptitiously timed how long it took each subject to 
reach the elevator. Astoundingly, those subjects who had completed the task with words 
pertaining to  elderly people walked significantly slower than the students in the control 
group. In the face of this study, and the many like it, it is obvious that our perceptual 
systems affect our actions in ways which are not consciously accessible. The 
consequences of this fact for the PoOM will be noted in Chapter 10.
In addition, much of the perceptual information broadcast in consciousness is pre-
conceptualized. Indeed, if perceptual systems did not interact with conceptual systems 
before global broadcast took place, they would fail to exclusively broadcast that 
information which is worthy of attention. So, some of the specialists take each other aside 
and give information before even entering the room with the blackboard. Because of this 
pre-blackboard collaboration, globally broadcast inputs, while wholly sensory in nature, 
do carry imbedded conceptual information. Otherwise, if first broadcasts were purely 
perceptual, we would not immediately see things as unitary wholes but as chunks of color 
and shape. We actually do see things categorized as unitary books, faces, and apples.74 
Even our most immediate perceptual judgments are already laced with conceptual 
content. The upshot of this for the mindreading faculty is that the way in which one 
interprets minds will have already been informed and biased before conscious global 
broadcast occurs.75
The evolutionary benefits of a global broadcast system are significant. For one, it 
74 Carruthers 2, 25
75 While tangential to the goals of this thesis, any defense of the global broadcast system must account for 
scientific knowledge about the working memory system. Carruthers Chapter 2 does this nicely, arguing 
that working memory is actually embedded in global broadcast.
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avoids unnecessary expenses of the same sort that counted against the evolutionary 
plausibility of an inner sense module. Moreover, because it consists of blanket-coverage 
rather than custom pipelined channels of access, global broadcast of perception allows 
varied structures in the brain to use sensory information without having to maintain direct 
communication with perceptual systems.
Another strong evolutionary benefit of the global broadcast system is that it easily 
welcomes new adaptations. A newly evolved cognitive processing module, as the 
mindreading module was at one time, does not have to come equipped with a network of 
channels for inputs and outputs. Rather, any new system already comes with the default 
setting of being attuned to global broadcasts of all the varied forms of perception, which 
can take care of its core processes while other more refined pre-global broadcast modes 
of communication can be created over time. Especially given the complex social 
situations humans rely on such cognitive modules to navigate, it is quite lucrative to 
allow those faculties access to a wide range of perceptual evidence rather than just that 
evidence which is pre-judged to be useful and therefore directly pipelined in. More 
fundamentally, a global broadcast system allows new modules, like computer software, to 
be added or removed from the architecture of the mind without disrupting the rest of the 
machine.
Thus far in the chapter I have detailed the core claims of ISA and argued that 
these claims, perhaps unlike the claims of competing theories, are compatible with an 
evolutionary picture of human development. In order to fully support Carruthers' theory, 
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though, I must go one step further, and check the validity of its predictions. A good theory 
must be checked against the world it intends to describe.
ISA makes two main predictions that differentiate it from the other prominent 
accounts. The first is that disassociation between one's capacity to ascribe mental states to 
oneself and to others should not exist. If a person can self-ascribe then she should be able 
to ascribe to others, and vice versa. The second prediction is that, via self-interpretation, 
one should frequently confabulate sensory evidence and commit mistakes in the 
ascription of mental states to oneself. Like Gazzaniga's patients and the head nodders 
from Chapter 5, a person should often misread her own mind. ISA relies entirely on the 
verification of both of these predictions: if either turns out to be false, then ISA is 
absolutely irredeemable. 
Moreover, neither of these predictions is compatible with the existence of an inner 
sense module. For Goldman, there must be people who are fully capable of self-
knowledge but who are incapable of mindreading others because they lack the simulative 
and imaginative capacities. Goldman, with fellow inner sense theorists Nichols and 
Stitch, looks to autistic people to fulfill this case. And confabulation data is particularly 
damning for Goldman. Cartesian introspection, at least in the absence of a meddling evil 
daemon, should never err. The nodders should correctly introspect their beliefs, 
regardless of whether or not they are nodding.
I will now argue that, with regards to these two predictions, the scientific evidence 
heavily favors ISA over inner sense theories. ISA predicts that development, genetic 
anomaly, brain damage, or any other change which inhibits or boosts 3rd person 
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mindreading ability should also equally inhibit or boost 1st person mindreading ability, 
and vice versa. If the mindreading faculty is a singular module which deals with both 
one's own and others' minds, then it should improve at mindreading others directly 
proportionally to its improvement at mindreading oneself, and degradation should be 
similarly proportionate.76 As far as normal human development goes, this does seem to be 
the case. 
If mindreading is innate and modular, as I argued in Chapter 6, then the 
mindreading module should develop the ability to attribute mental states to others 
concurrently with the ability to recognize one's own mental states. Because human infants 
consciously draw attention to their own intentions, desires, and so on from an early age, 
evidence that shows conscious understanding of others' mental states at a similarly early 
age is required to vindicate this prediction. As Goldman contends, the classic Wimmer 
and Perner studies showing false-belief understanding at the age of 4 do not cut it. The 
Baillargeon spontaneous-response tasks, on the other hand, show the ability to attribute 
propositional attitudes to others at a very young age and hence constitute just such 
evidence.
As noted in Chapter 6, it is uncontroversial that autistic people have significant 
trouble with mindreading tasks, and perhaps, in severe cases, lack mindreading capacities 
altogether. They are thus a prime source for dissociation data. Unfortunately, it is 
controversial whether autistic people struggle with ascribing mental states to themselves, 
76 Note that this prediction only applies to changes to the mindreading system itself, rather than the 
perceptual systems that provide its inputs. If one goes deaf, then 3rd person mindreading is likely to suffer to 
a greater degree than 1st person mindreading, and if one loses to ability to produce inner-speech then the 
opposite is likely. But the fact that 3rd person and 1st person mindreading use different globally broadcasts 
perceptions to various degrees does not count against them being produced by the same module. Such, in 
fact, is the power of the global broadcast system in the first place.
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with evidence seemingly supporting such struggle and other evidence seemingly denying 
it.77 If people with autism, despite struggling on mindreading tasks, show normal 
understanding of their own mental states, then ISA is a bad account. If, on the other hand, 
autistic people struggle with ascriptions of self-belief as well as other-belief, then inner 
sense theories are called into doubt. Indeed, inner sense theorists Nichols and Stitch 
(2003) hold that one of the best reasons for upholding the existence of an introspective 
faculty is that while autistic people have considerable trouble attributing mental states to 
others, they are able to attribute such states to themselves normally.
Nichols and Stitch rely upon studies that, while generally well-run, only 
questionably support the conclusions drawn therefrom. For example, Nichols and Stitch 
take any study that shows autistic individuals successfully reporting their own mental 
states to be support for their claim, and the vast majority of the studies they reference use 
adults or children over the age of 11 as subjects. But it is not that case that autistic 
individuals always fail mindreading tasks. On the contrary, while autistic individuals 
develop mindreading abilities much later than others, they (whether they are actually 
engaging in mindreading or simply following heuristics) do show competence in 
mindreading tasks by the age of 11. Inner sense theory, in predicting a dissociation, does 
not gain ground by showing that adult autistic subjects can successfully attribute mental 
states to themselves. Indeed, this is exactly what ISA predicts, for (as is actually 
concurrently tested in many of the studies) they can also successfully attribute mental 
states to others.78
77 Carruthers 9, 11
78 Carruthers 9, 9
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Moreover, strengthening this objection is the fact that none of the studies Nichols 
and Stitch cite actually test autistic subjects' access to their current propositional attitudes. 
Instead, having been designed for a wide variety of purposes other than proving Nichols 
and Stitch's hypothesis, they test things like memory formation.79 There is no reason, 
under ISA and contemporary memory research, to suspect that memory formation and 
retrieval involves metarepresentation of the kind carried out by the mindreading system 
set on oneself. The lack of a mindreading module should not correspond to an inability to 
create and remember memories. So, all that Nichols and Stitch have proven is that autistic 
individuals have unimpaired access to kinds of self-knowledge that both ISA and inner 
sense theories should take them to have.
On the other hand, some studies that actually seem to get at current propositional 
attitudes suggest that children with autism are poor at self-ascribing mental states. More 
to the point, a handful of studies show that in general the ability to self-ascribe 
propositional attitudes comes online, in normal humans as well as autistic humans, at the 
same age as the ability to ascribe propositional attitudes to others.
For example, in a study by Phillips et alia (1998), children (both autistic and 
otherwise) were instructed to shoot a toy ray gun at various canisters in hopes of hitting a 
canister that contained a prize. They guns did not actually fire projectiles of any sort, but 
instead experimenters surreptitiously (in ways undetectable even by present adults) 
knocked over predetermined canisters. Before firing the children were asked which 
canister they intended to shoot, and then after hitting a canister they were asked which 
canister they had intended to shoot. As ISA predicts, autistic children, especially after 
79 Carruthers 9, 11
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winning a prize for shooting a canister they had not originally intended to shoot, were 
much more likely than normal children to claim to have intended to shoot the canister 
they in fact hit, but did not in fact intend to shoot. They, just as autistic children 
performing mindreading tasks have difficulty differentiating  between others' intentions 
and goals, could not differentiate between their own intentions (e.g. to shoot the leftmost 
canister) and goals (e.g. to shoot the canister with the prize.)
In another experiment, conducted by Williams and Happe (2009), the 
experimenter asked kids to get a bandaid for her as she pretended to have cut her finger. 
There were a variety of objects on a close by table, including a clearly marked bandaid 
box. The kids opened the box,  and found not bandaids but crayons inside. When asked 
what they believed was in the bandaid box, autistic children were much more liable than 
normal children to respond “crayons”. Just as they are unable to accurately report on 
others' false beliefs, they were unable to accurately report on their own false beliefs. 
Indeed, Williams and Happe show that children become able to report their own false 
beliefs at the same age they would be able to report others' false beliefs. Normally 
functioning kids claim they expected the box to contain crayons up until around the age 
of 4, and autistic kids claim the same until the age of 11. Upon reaching those ages, the 
same ages that verbal reports of mindreading of others come online, the kids were able to 
acknowledge that they expected the box to contain bandaids.
The neural structures implicated in the 3rd person mindreading system are well-
documented and generally agreed upon. There is a mindreading network in the brain – 
consisting of the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the temporal 
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pole, the superior temporal sulcus, and the temporo-parietal junction – which lights up on 
brain imaging scans when one is involved in mindreading tasks. Castelli et alia (2002) 
note that the same structures light up when a highly functioning autistic individual does 
mindreading tasks, but to a much lesser degree. Thus, dissociation might be at play if this 
same neural network is not also implicated in 1st person mindreading.
Brain scanning studies are very difficult work, and most if not all of the studies 
that have been done regarding self-judgments and other-judgments have clear and 
significant flaws.80 The best and most recent brain scan studies are those done by 
Lombardo et alia (2010). Lombardo's study consisted of asking subjects connected to a 
brain scanner questions about how likely they were to engage in certain propositional 
attitudes, such as thinking that keeping a diary is important. Lombardo also asked these 
subjects how likely the Queen of England was to think that keeping a diary is important. 
As ISA predicts, in both cases, whether subjects were reporting their own mental states or 
the mental states of the Queen, the same mindreading network lit up. The scans did show 
different parts of the network to be active to different degrees in the two trials, and that 
the network in general was more active in the self condition. Lombardo concludes that 
this is troublesome for ISA.
But he is wrong. ISA is perfectly compatible with, indeed should predict, the 
mindreading system being variously and even more involved in 1st person mindreading. 
After all, ISA claims that one uses more and different sources of perceptual information 
when self-ascribing mental states than when ascribing them to others, and one's own 
mental states are likely to carry much more practical weight for that person than the 
80 Carruthers 9, 25
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Queen of England's. On the other hand, Lombardo's findings do challenge Goldman's 
introspection-based simulation theory. Simulation theory actually predicts that 3rd person 
mindreading should use more brain power than 1st person mindreading, as it involves 
activating and running the 1st person introspection module plus other imaginative and 
faculties.
So, based on brain-imaging and autism studies it appears that at the very least 
there is no strong case to be made that a dissociation between 1st and 3rd person 
mindreading exists. Indeed, there is growing theoretical evidence that dissociation does 
not exist. The evidence regarding another of ISA's predictions, that confabulation occurs 
in interpretation of one's own mind, is much more powerful.
ISA predicts that, given the fact that 3rd person mindreading often involves 
misinterpretation, so too should 1st person mindreading. Carruthers appeals to an 
immense amount of evidence to vindicate this second prediction. Not only does the 
evidence overwhelmingly show subjects messing up when self-ascribing mental states 
and never being aware of that mess up, but it also shows that such mess ups occur in 
situations when, given the existence of Cartesian privileged access, the subjects should 
have easily been able to introspect their actual mental states. Thus, all forms of inner 
sense theory, and the existence of any sort of mental transparency, are called gravely into 
doubt.
Recall Gazzaniga once again. The commissurotomy patient in his study was 
indisputably self-interpreting, and botching the job. Further, because of the transparency 
assumption, he lacked awareness not only of having botched interpretation, but of having 
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interpreted at all. He simply confabulated his own mental state and went on his merry 
way. 
The only way that inner sense theorists can duck the implications of this 
confabulation for their work is by doing two things. First, they must stress that, being a 
commissurotomy patient, the subject was not operating under normal conditions and thus 
was much more likely to interpret one's own mind than introspect in those conditions. 
Which is the second thing: that they must not, like Goldman (2006), propose a single 
introspective faculty. Instead, like Nichols and Stitch, they must propose a two system 
model of self-knowledge, in which humans possess an introspective module as well as a 
mindreading module and turn their mindreading module on themselves when, for some 
reason or another (such as commissurotomy) they cannot introspect. Indeed, the 
confabulation evidence is so compelling that Goldman himself has come around and is 
now proposing a two system model.81 Perhaps the ultimately most compelling general 
evidence in favor of ISA is that, by and large, over the last 15 years of debate, Carruthers' 
competitors have substantially altered their theories to more resemble his, rather than vice 
versa.
But the two system model of inner sense is also quite dubious given numerous 
confabulation experiments. A number of experiments show that perfectly normally 
functioning subjects, like the Wells and Petty headnodders, misinterpret their own 
propositional attitudes even in situations where there is no reason to lack access to 
introspection (if introspection exists.) For example, the classic Nisbett and Wilson (1997) 
panty-hose experiment shows that subjects attribute a judgment to themselves that it 
81 See Goldman (2009)
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seems clear they did not actually make. In this experiment, subjects, thinking they were 
involved in a market survey, were presented with four identical items of panty-hose and 
asked which one they preferred. Despite all of the panty-hose being the same, the subjects 
showed a very strong bias for the panty-hose on the right hand side (perhaps due to a 
right-hand attention bias or the English speaker's tendency to scan items left to right). 
When asked to explain their choices, the subjects immediately offered false reasons, such 
as softness or color, for picking the rightmost panty-hose.
So, the subjects made a judgment (that the rightmost panty-hose were the best) 
and then, when asked why they made that judgment, misinterpreted their own reasoning. 
They did so in the same exact way as they might have misinterpreted an other's reasoning 
if they had watched someone else pick out panty-hose. Further, unlike in the Gazzaniga 
experiments, there is no reason  for them to have used their mindreading system rather 
than their introspective module in this situation. No reason, that is, except that 
introspection does not exist.
My above account of the plausibility of ISA is by no means complete. In his 
forthcoming book The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, 
Carruthers presents a much more thorough account of ISA, and a great deal more 
evidence from cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience both for ISA's truth and 
against the truth of competing theories. What I have done, I hope, is shown that there 
exists at least one good theoretical option that maintains that the way by which one 
believes oneself to be minded is the same as the way by which one believes others to be 
minded. The remainder of my thesis will be dedicated to examining the implications the 
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truth of such a theory would have for the problem of other minds.
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Part IV
Dissolving the Problem of Other Minds
Part I laid out the conceptual and epistemological problems of other minds. Part II 
laid out my naturalistic methodology. Part III applied this methodology to the conceptual 
problem of other minds. Now, in Part IV, I explicate my conclusions based on this 
application. In Chapter 8, with reference to ISA, I solve the conceptual problem of other 
minds. My solution runs parallel to, and illuminates several key points of, the post-
Wittgensteinian solution. But it also differs importantly. Then, in Chapter 9 I show that 
ISA dissolves the epistemological problem of other minds.
Chapter 8
Solving the Conceptual Problem
I mentioned at the start of Chapter 7 that that chapter, alongside most of the post-
Wittgensteinian work, does not (at least explicitly) argue that the concept of mind at work 
in 1st person and 3rd person ascriptions is univocal. Rather, it argues that the ways in 
which those concepts are arrived at is univocal; for the post-Wittgensteinians that way is 
usage in language and for Carruthers that way is the mindreading module. This 
distinction immediately raises a concern. If I use my mindreading system to attribute a 
mind both to you and to myself, does that necessarily entail that I attribute the same 
concept of mind to you as to myself? Thoughtfully applying Carruther's account of 
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interpretive mindreading to Strawson's account of the descriptive metaphysics of 
personhood ameliorates this worry.
Carruther's evidence shows that the mindreading system attributes the same sorts 
of mental states (false beliefs, intentions, et cetera) in 1st and 3rd person cases. However, 
as noted in Chapter 7, there is, given differing amounts and kinds of evidence, a disparity 
in degree of understanding between my own mind and other minds. There is even a 
disparity in kind of understanding in that, for example, I interpret my own visual inputs 
but not yours. But while the sources of informational input to the global broadcast system 
differ, the processing of that system and its types of outputs do not.  Insofar as the mind is 
active – insofar as we take mindedness (or at least that mindedness which is at stake in 
the PoOM) to refer to the outputs rather than the inputs of the mind – I attribute all of the 
same mental states to others as to myself. I do not in general take you nor myself to be 
mentally capable of any kind of thing of which the other is incapable.
As detailed in Chapter 2, Strawson takes usage in language – the various ways in 
which we employ the concept of mindedness – to prove that we imagine other minds and 
our own minds in the same manner. Indeed, our grammar makes it impossible for us to 
imagine our own minds in any manner different from other minds. Carruthers' work 
provides theoretical support for the conclusion of this claim, while undermining one of 
Strawson's beliefs. We use the same language to point out the same concept of 
mindedness in our own case and others' because the mental process of interpretation is 
the same in each case. But our concept of mindedness (our own and others') is not robust 
and simple as Strawson takes it to be, but rather the messy sum of, or one specific 
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instantiation of, our images of our multitudinous interpretations of mindedness.
Strawson assumes that concepts are tidy holistic entities. More importantly, he 
assumes they are permanent. But, in light of ISA, the notion of 'concept' in Strawson's 
theory is not one we should take seriously. Concepts are ephemeral packages of acquired 
information, not holistic objects. Thus, my claim that the concept of 'minded' is univocal 
is quite different from Strawson's version of the same claim.
Assuming ISA, we come to believe in minds by way of attribution of mental 
states stemming from the mindreading module. Our working concept of mindedness, for 
Carruthers, is simply a summation of all of our conscious images of mental states we 
have attributed. So, because we attribute active mindedness to others by means of the 
same mechanism by which we attribute it to ourselves, our concept of an other mind is as 
a matter of fact univocal with our concept of our own mind. In a very Strawsonian move, 
I take Carruthers' version of global broadcast to entail conceptual identity because it is 
simply the fact of the matter that we broadcast the concept univocally. The 'grammar' of 
the concept 'mind', in this case the fact that it is dressed in sensory clothing when globally 
broadcast, mandates its univocal nature. 
Recall Figure A from Chapter 7. Perception writes a certain behavior (whether 
one's own or that of an other) on the blackboard, which the mindreading system reads off 
of the blackboard and interprets as a minded behavior. The mindreading system then 
relays that information to a perceptual system, which writes some version of 'the 
individual who committed the behavior is minded' on the blackboard. The mindreading 
system never interacts directly with the mind in question (once again whether one's own, 
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or that of an other), but rather interprets perceptions and feeds attributions of mindedness 
back into sensory systems which in turn broadcast them as images of mindedness. There 
is thus no room to substantially differentiate between the 1st and 3rd person concepts. Both 
concepts of mind are simply processed images of interpretations of the perceived 
behavior of a subject.
Remembering the discussion at the start of Chapter 7, the post-Wittgensteinians 
are correct. The way by which one believes oneself to be minded is the same as the way 
by which one believes others to be minded. And this fact does entail that the concept of 
mind attributed to oneself is the same as the concept of mind attributed to others. The 
concept is simply that which announces the results of the method. For Carruthers, the 
concept 'minded' is the broadcast image of belief in mindedness (whether one's own or an 
other's). For the post-Wittgensteinian, the concept 'minded' refers to the more primitive 
concept 'person' which in turn announces that the competent language-user has witnessed 
someone acting. Again, the witnessed agent may be the post-Wittgensteinian herself or an 
other person.
Indeed, in this same manner, all of the core post-Wittgensteinian points are 
vindicated by the science.82 For example, Avramides' lived position is characterized by 
engagement and interaction with other agents. Opposed to the lived position is the 
armchair, from which philosophers posit questions like the PoOM. The armchair mindset 
is that of the conceptual conservative who, rather than making his philosophy conform 
with the world, just works off of dubious beliefs and intuitions. Thus, the progressive 
82 This point also works to vindicate Avramides' claim that Strawson's version of the post-Wittgensteinian 
solution is compatible with Davidson's radical interpretation version. It is by the very act of unconscious 
interpretation by the mindreading system that we come to understand ourselves and others as minded 
persons.
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naturalist might claim that what is most crucial to the lived position is not interaction, per 
se, but rather a scientific understanding of the world as a communal place, and of humans 
as evolved organisms. The lived position, in the naturalist's hands, is merely a call to shed 
esoteric and dubious concepts and to work instead from concepts given by the world.
Behavior proper and action, then, are just behavior which the mindreading system 
interprets as the behavior of an agent. Where the mindreading module attributes 
mindedness, there is behavior proper. The mindreading module attributes mindedness to 
myself and to others, and this mindedness is a univocal concept. So, I have solved the 
conceptual problem and established the truth of P3 of the argument from Chapter 2: the 
concept of mindedness at work in belief in one's own mind is the same concept as the 
concept of mindedness at work in belief in other minds.
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Chapter 9
Dissolving the Epistemological Problem
As noted in Chapter 2, the argument that sets up the epistemological PoOM runs 
as follows:
P1 One believes that oneself is minded.
P2 One believes that others are minded.
P3 The concept of mindedness at work in P1 and P2 is univocal.
P4 One justifies belief in one's own mind by virtue of direct access to that mind.
P5 One lacks such direct access to other minds.
C One must find another way to justify belief in other minds.
If any one of the premises is false, then the conclusion does not follow, and the 
problem of other minds does not occur. The post-Wittgensteinian conclusion is that 
solving the conceptual problem confirms P1, P2, P3 and P4, but undermines P5. 
According to Strawson and Avramides, by virtue of being a person interacting with other 
people and using a common ordinary language, one has direct linguo-behavioral access to 
others' minds as well as one's own mind. Thus, since P5 is false, C does not follow, and 
the PoOM does not occur.
I disagree with the post-Wittgensteinians on one key point, and thereby make the 
position much more plausible. P5 is actually true. We do not have special access to other 
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minds. But this is inconsequential because by casting doubt on the transparency 
assumption, and advancing the indirect sensory-access theory of self-knowledge, 
Carruthers shows that P4 is false. While the post-Wittgensteinians are correct that 1st and 
3rd person access are univocal, they are wrong that it stems from any special sort of direct 
access. Rather, all belief in mindedness is globally broadcast by sensory systems and 
indirectly stems from interpretation by the mindreading system. Thus, my response to the 
PoOM runs as follows:
P1 One believes that oneself is minded.
P2 One believes that others are minded.
P3 The concept of mindedness at work in P1 and P2 is univocal.
P4 One believes in one's own mind by virtue of the mindreading module.
P5 One believes in other minds by virtue of the mindreading module.
C One has no differential reason for justifying belief in one's own mind than one 
has for justifying belief in other minds.
The classic epistemological PoOM is thus dissolved. Or, more exactly, does not 
occur in the first place. There is no belief in other minds that requires differential 
justification than belief in one's own mind. The skeptic is forced to retreat from the 
problem of other minds to the problem of any minds, and from solipsism to metaphysical 
nihilism.
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Part V 
Concluding Remarks
Part I introduced the problem of other minds. Part II introduced my naturalistic 
methodology. Part III applied this methodology to the problem of other minds. Part IV 
concluded that the epistemological problem of other minds does not occur. Now, Part V 
examines the scope and power of my conclusion. Chapter 10 raises and responds to a 
couple of objections to my view. Finally, Chapter 11 notes that even if my particular 
conclusions are wrong, my thesis retains importance as an example of progressive 
naturalistic inquiry.
Chapter 10
A Qualification
To iterate, solving the conceptual problem of other minds is a matter of nailing 
down the concepts at work in the epistemological problem of other minds, and checking 
whether or not they make the epistemological problem internally consistent. Obviously, 
the first of these concepts, and the most difficult to pin down, is simply 'mindedness'. I 
claim in Chapter 8 that the concept of 'mind' is univocal, but I have not yet provided a 
clear answer as to what exactly, when one worries about justifying her belief in a mind, 
one is referring to. The answer that best coheres with a post-Wittgensteinian and/or 
Carruthersian account is that 'mind' – at least insofar as it is implicated in the PoOM – 
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refers to the sorts of higher order mental functions, such as propositional attitudes, that 
are ascribed by the mindreading module. Propositional attitudes, recall, are those mental 
states that relate persons to propositions. Basically, this sort of answer takes mindedness 
as that which grants the status of 'subject' to a person. Under this account, the PoOM 
could be called the problem of other subjects. Or perhaps, in Strawsonian terms, the 
problem of other persons. Insofar as the epistemological problem of other minds is 
identical to the problem of other subjects or persons, it is easily dissolvable by reference 
to the work of Strawson and Carruthers.
 But it is conceivable that the PoOM refers to a concept of 'mind' broader than, or 
perhaps entirely distinct from, the concept of 'subject'. We currently know too little to 
know the precise scope of psychological phenomena that fall under ISA. That is, our 
mindreading module seems most at home attributing beliefs, desires, and other 
psychological states that are intentional or propositional. Thus, if there are psychological 
states that are undetectable or unprocessable or uninterpretable by the mindreading 
module, then they will lie outside the scope of the theory. If the PoOM refers, for 
example, to the question of whether another person feels emotions, then Carruthers' 
evidence is not nearly as strong as if it refers to propositional attitudes. 
Carruthers allows that, given a dearth of scientific evidence, it is possible that 
visceral 'feelings' (such as disgust or lust) may not be subject to the mindreading system, 
but rather transparently accessible to the global broadcast of consciousness. However, 
Carruthers does produce good evidence that emotions, insofar as they might be 
introspectable at all, can only be intuited in rough, affective, perceptual form. Any sort of 
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emotional or affective nuance, along with any sort of conceptual content, is understood 
through interpretation by the mindreading module, and thus falls under our purview.83 
Moreover, I suspect that as more science is done, it will become evident that even the 
rawest of emotions are always processed in some way before reaching consciousness, and 
that this specific worry will be ameliorated altogether.
A more problematic conception of the PoOM, for my purposes, is that it is 
identical not with the problem of other subjects, but with the problem of other mere 
consciousnesses. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this sort of scope problem comes 
from the alleged possibility of automata or philosophical zombies. Zombies are beings 
who behave, look, and function like humans in every way except that they are not 
conscious. What if the PoOM does not refer to the problem of justifying belief that others 
have beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes, but rather to the problem of justifying belief 
that others have qualia; that it is like something to be an other person, in the same way as 
it is like something to be oneself? David Chalmers (1996) famously terms the explanation 
of qualitative conscious experience the 'hard problem'. There exist, Chalmers claims, 
certain qualia (defined by Dennett as “the way things seem to us”84) that characterize 
consciousness and that are indescribable in physical terms. Indeed, many philosophers 
posit that there is an explanatory gap at play: that consciousness and qualia simply cannot 
be explained in physical terms. The problem of other consciousnesses is thus as follows: 
my consciousness may well have access to my mind in the same way as it has access to 
your mind, but what evidence do I have that you have a conscious awareness that 
83 Carruthers 4, 33
84 Dennett 381
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similarly accesses any minds?
But it is difficult to see why this is a possibility that the progressive naturalist 
should worry about. Philosophical zombies are a real worry only if all our functionally 
characterized psychological capacities – affect, emotion, desire, belief, memory, 
perception, learning, judgment, et cetera – can constitute a coherent psychology in the 
complete absence of all subjectively felt qualities. My zombie twin would have to be a 
mammal, and just as good at learning as I am. Yet it is difficult to imagine any known 
mammal (including me) learning about its environment without the subjectively felt 
characteristics that accompany rewards, deprivations, and punishments. We know too 
much about the actual neural mechanisms of learning, especially the dopamine system in 
the midbrain85, to take seriously the claim that learning can occur without vividly felt 
qualities of various sorts. 
Furthermore, we might grant that there are some intuitions that seem to give 
credence to Chalmers’ claim – we might even agree that zombies seem to be conceivable 
to us – but in that case we must consider the possibility that ‘qualia’ is a dubious concept. 
It is dubious by psychological role, in that our best reason to uphold it is intuition. And it 
is plausibly dubious by descent, since it is a vestige of our Cartesian substance dualist 
ancestry. So, as naturalists, we must bracket the concept of qualia, and move forward in 
our inquiry without assuming it exists. Furthermore, if our best scientific accounts do not 
make room for qualia, then we, as Daniel Dennett argued, should hold that “contrary to 
what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.”86 If this is right, then 
85 See Panksepp (1998 and 2009)
86 Dennett 409
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the zombie objection has no real traction against my view.
And, lo and behold, ISA, our best scientific account, makes no room for qualia. 
ISA holds that one must necessarily be conscious to be a self-aware subject. Self-aware 
subjecthood is predicated on qualitative consciousness. So, establishing that one is a 
subject is sufficient for establishing that one is conscious. For Carruthers, consciousness 
is merely a passive byproduct of global broadcast. All and only the contents of global 
broadcasts are conscious, and consciousness is explained by the fact of their being 
broadcast. And, for any propositional attitudes to be expressed through behavior, some 
sensory information has to be globally broadcast. So global broadcast, and with it 
consciousness, coincides with (and usually predates) the expression of propositional 
attitudes. Thus, if I attribute propositional attitudes to an other, I must be attributing 
consciousness to that other. If I show that there is no greater problem with belief in an 
other's subjecthood than my own, then there is likewise no greater problem with belief in 
an other consciousness than my own. 
Now, there are cases where this does not hold true. As mentioned in Chapter 7, 
priming experiments show that our perceptual systems affect our actions in ways which 
are not consciously accessible. Humans thus sometimes behave without being 
consciously aware of behaving. In this case, my mindreading module might interpret an 
other as being a subject (and thus conscious) when conscious states do not actually 
accompany that other's propositional states. But priming experiments show precisely that 
my mindreading module might just as easily interpret myself as being a conscious subject 
when conscious states do not accompany my propositional states! In the Bargh, Chen, 
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and Burroughs study, subjects were not consciously aware of their slow gait.87 In these 
sorts of cases (and given the huge scope of priming experiments, these sorts of cases are 
likely constantly occurring) I am a philosophical zombie. I function like a subject, yet am 
not conscious of that functioning. So there is no greater reason to believe an other is a 
zombie than to believe that I myself am a zombie.
There only remains one move for my opponent to make: to insist that she is not 
talking about physical possibility, but logical or conceptual possibility. I have two replies. 
First, no one has given a non-question-begging account of conceivability that establishes 
that zombies are possible in any sense at all. Surely we can think we have conceived of 
some state of affairs when in fact we have not. So, until we have a defensible account of 
conceivability, we must withhold authority from Chalmers’ claim. Second, even if we had 
a defensible account of conceivability, and even if zombies were conceivable, it is hard to 
see what bearing that would have on the PoOM. The traditional epistemological problem 
of other minds is the problem of justifying that those around me have mental states just 
like my own. It is not merely the problem of justifying that those around me have qualia. 
This is a point even Chalmers should concede. So, at the very worst, if my view fails to 
apply to qualia it certainly does not follow that the view fails to resolve a central part of 
the PoOM. 
Moreover, even if this very worst case is true – even if the PoOM is in fact the 
problem of other consciousnesses, rather than the problem of other subjects, and, contrary 
to the above argument, self-aware subjecthood is not necessarily predicated on 
consciousness –  a potential naturalistic response is still on offer. Namely, the science 
87 Bargh, Chen, and Burroughs 19
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shows that the infamous argument from analogy might not be such a bad response to the 
PoOM after all. The argument from analogy is the classic response to the PoOM that I 
can justify belief in other minds by noting that I have a mind and that others are like me 
in myriad ways and thus probably also have minds. Many take this to be a very bad 
argument because it involves an overly bold induction from one case to many.
But, with extensive research in evolutionary biology on his side, in “Evolution 
and the Problem of Other Minds” Elliott Sober (2000) presents an argument from 
analogy and evolutionary parsimony which just might dispel these concerns. His 
argument, greatly simplified, runs something like what follows. Humans are evolved 
animals. Through science and probability theory, we have come to know certain things 
about evolved species, and particularly the evolution of humans. For one, given 
phylogenetic parsimony and likelihood analysis, any feature of any particular human that 
is as complex and integral as mindedness is extremely likely to also be a feature of the 
vast majority of (if not all) other humans. Therefore, the argument from analogy is not as 
bad an argument as philosophers make it out to be; it is in fact not an argument from 
analogy at all but instead a very good inference to the best explanation. While in any 
given case it is logically possible that an other lacks a mind, we have very strong 
inductive evidence to believe that she is minded.
So, to summarize this chapter, I must qualify my thesis by noting that there is a 
conception of the PoOM – as the problem of other mere consciousnesses – that might 
escape my dissolution. There is reason to believe that it does not, as an idea of 
unconscious self-aware subjecthood is incoherent on the Carruthersian account. Further, 
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even if a version of the PoOM does escape my analysis, it might be dealt with neatly by 
Sober's argument from analogy and evolutionary parsimony. Nonetheless, my thesis is 
strongest if the epistemological PoOM taken to be problematic is the problem of other 
evolved subjects.
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Chapter 11
Towards a New Naturalistic Paradigm
For reasons touched on throughout this thesis, my overarching positive claim – 
that the epistemological problem of other minds does not occur –  is the conclusion of a 
line of thought that is admittedly not a knockdown argument. Most controversially, my 
argumentation relies on the uncertain assertions that Carruthers' ISA theory is correct, and 
that the important PoOM is the problem of other evolved subjects rather than the problem 
of other merely phenomenal consciousnesses. Despite the scientific evidence I have 
produced to the contrary, we may have introspective access to our own minds. After all 
ISA is a cutting-edge scientific theory, and any cutting-edge scientific theory is, simply 
by virtue of its novelty, likely to be importantly flawed. Likewise, despite my arguments 
in Chapter 10, the overriding concern regarding other minds might merely be that they 
comprise, in part, raw phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in physical 
terms.
If either one of these things is true, then my conclusion does not follow. However, 
with the post-Wittgensteinians, I have no compelling reason to take either of them as true. 
And, moreso than the post-Wittgensteinians, I have compelling evidence that they are 
false. At minimum, I take this thesis to make it plausible that knowledge of other minds 
should not constitute a special problem.
However, whether or not my argument succeeds with respect to the PoOM, I hope 
that this thesis is successful as a paradigmatic example and extension of Daviesian 
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naturalistic inquiry, as detailed in Subjects of the World. More ambitiously, I hope that the 
way in which I arrive at my conclusion might act as a model for future work in 
philosophy. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the scientist will probably never be able to 
satisfy the radically skeptical epistemologist with her account of a human knowing 
another human's mind. However, I take myself to have provided an example of how the 
scientist might be able to convince the skeptic that she has as much reason to doubt her 
own mind as an other human's. And this powerful stroke against solipsism has clear 
philosophical import.
The shell of my argument runs something like the following:
P1 Philosophers should not assume the existence of dubious concepts, unless said 
concepts are vindicated by science.
P2 Philosophical debate X assumes concept Y.
P3 Concept Y is dubious for such and such reasons.
P4 The science does not support the existence of concept Y.
C Philosophical debate X should actually be philosophical debate X minus Y.
In particular, I conclude that the PoOM should have the dubious concept that one's own 
mind is a special case subtracted from it. The main implication of this conclusion for my 
thesis is that the real epistemological problem about minds pertains to the existence of 
mindedness itself. 
This basic argumentative form might be fruitfully applied to various wrongheaded 
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approaches to issues in philosophy, ranging from externalism about moral reasons to 
libertarian notions of free will. In my view, good naturalism and insistent 
interdisciplinarianism do not boil down to an attempt to replace philosophy with science. 
Rather, they constitute an attempt to make sure philosophers focus on problems that are 
really worth their time and expertise. And this attempt crucially involves bracketing 
dubious concepts.
Insofar as the philosopher is asking a particular question (in this case the problem 
of other evolved subjects), and insofar as a particular scientific account is correct (in this 
case the indirect sensory-access theory of self-knowledge), the philosopher and the 
scientist can speak to and not past each other. It is possible that I have represented the 
PoOM inaccurately, and ISA may well be dead wrong. Nonetheless, there is a certain 
philosophical problem (namely the PoOM as I represent it) that definitely can be either 
vindicated (if some sort of modular transparent access is found to exist) or dissolved (if 
ISA is accurate) by science. Whether or not it does so satisfactorily in this thesis, science 
can inform philosophy. And this thesis acts as a blueprint illustrating how.
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